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1. Introduction
It is often stated that the link between unemployment and growth is broken. Though this is not
true with regard to employment measured in hours or persons there might be a grain of truth in
the statement referring to the official unemployment rate. A possible reason for a missing link
between growth and unemployment is increased labour supply. The following paper should
analyze the main determinants of labour supply for the European countries. It aims at giving
some projections for labour supply for the coming years based on assumptions on demographic
trends, migration, female labour participation, and other possible relevant factors. Moreover, it
will be discussed whether reducing the labour force is an advisable strategy of dealing with
Europe's labour market problems.
The paper is organized as follows. In a first step a so-called labour market balance for
Euroland as a whole is developed. It is discussed whether this tool might help to understand the
developments on Europe’s labour market. It turns out, however, that drawing more specific
conclusions from this highly aggregated approach is hampered mainly by serious statistical
problems. Therefore, in a second step, the relation between key labour force variables and the
business cycle is analyzed in a more detailed framework. We use a panel of 18 OECD
countries and break down the labour force participation rate by age and sex. The results are
economically meaningful and provide some insights in the interaction between labour force
participation and unemployment. Particularly, it is emphasized that the correlation between the
unemployment rate and the participation rate is negative rather than positive as it is sometimes
assumed in the public opinion. However, the panel approach does not allow for a richer
discussion of the dynamics and the trend behaviour of the variables under investigation. Thus,
we turn to a country-by-country estimation in section 4. In this paragraph we use more time
series orientated econometric techniques to shed light on the determinants of labour force
participation in selected countries of Europe. These equations will also be exploited to give
forecasts of the labour force in Europe. The last section is devoted to police conclusions. In
particular we will discuss whether or not a policy of reducing the labour force may be
advisable.
2. A Labour Market Balance for the European Union
2.1 Developing the Balance
The construction of labour market balances (LMB) as an instrument for analyzing and fore-
casting the situation on the labour market has a long tradition in Germany. First tentative ex-
periments in this direction are reaching back as far as to the time of the Great Depression 1929–
1932 (Holst 2000: pp. 23). After World War II, it was in particular the Institute for Labour
Market and Vocational Research (IAB) of the Federal Labour Office that has developed this
concept further.
The present second draft of the LMB (see Table 1 in the annex) is essentially a refined version
of our first more experimental approach to identify and quantify the sources of labour supply in
EU-15. The forecasting basis has been actualized so as to include, among others, the results of
the EUROSTAT Labour Force Samples 1998 and 1999
1
 as well as provisional data for 2000
which have been derived from official EUROSTAT Labour Market Statistics.
Apart from the basic demographic data, which rely almost exclusively on "EUROSTAT,
Population Statistics, data 1960–1999 (edition '99)" as well as on the 2000 edition of
EUROSTAT European Social Statistics, Population, the crucial elements of the LMB for EU-15
are the employment and unemployment figures for the years from 1995 until 1999 presented in
the Labour Force Samples for EU-15 by EUROSTAT. Concerning the years before (1985 until
1994) much effort has been devoted to construct series for employment and unemployment in
EU-15 with the mutual aid of OECD Labour Force Statistics and the EUROSTAT Labour Force
Sample data for EU-13. Both series have to fulfil mainly two conditions:
1. In level terms no significant break with the employment and unemployment figures given
by EUROSTAT for EU-15 (sample basis) from 1995 onwards.
2. An adequate representation of the cyclical component in both series from 1985 to 1994.
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These are typed in italics in Table 1 since there have been made some methodological
changes in preparing the samples as compared with the years before.
The unavoidable inconsistencies between demographic and educational systems data turned out
to be mainly of a short-term character and thus could be at least partly eliminated by smoothing
the time series "Persons in working age who are neither scholars nor students" by a three-year
moving average. At first sight, the sudden interruption of the strong upward trend in the total
work force (as just defined) during 1993/94 might appear implausible. It results mainly from a
big upsurge in the number of students at universities and to a lesser extent from a stronger than
normal rise in the number of scholars at secondary stage II which began already in 1992.
Thereafter (1995), just the opposite was the case, and the total work force resumed their
growth. In our opinion this phenomenon shows that during and immediately after the recession
in 1993 labour market conditions worsened so much that it was a superior strategy especially
for students to stay at universities and improve their educational level rather than to accept
inferior jobs on the labour market or to remain unemployed for a more or less long period.
2
When the labour market recovered in 1995 the "backlog" of scholars and students which had
been built up in 1993/94 was dissolved and made itself felt in a growing stream to the labour
market.
3
Relating the actual labour force (employment plus unemployment) to the smoothed series of the
total work force (as defined above) yielded a visible participation rate which shows, on the
basis of yearly changes and with one major exception in 1989, the expected negative relation-
ship with the corresponding changes of the unemployment rate (see Figure 1). This relation is
statistically significant (estimation period: 1986–2000; method of estimation: OLS):
(1) DVISPR DALILOQ DUM= - -0 386 0 0 601 89
4 9 3 9 9
. .426 .
( . ) ( . ) (1. )
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There is a strong tendency at least among German entrepreneurs to prefer, other things being
equal, candidates for vacancies who have not to list periods of (registered) unemployment in
their curriculum vitae. It may well be that similar trends can be observed in other countries
of the European Union. Occasionally, there might exist some gender-specific differences in
this respect, i.e. females should be less affected by this negative selection criterion than
males.
3
The renewed decline of the number of persons in working age who are neither scholars nor
students in the year 2000 should be interpreted with some caution since official EUROSTAT
data about the participation in the educational system are only available until 1997.
R D W F statistic2 0 568 211 7 90= = - =. . . . .
where  DVISPR/DALILOQ denotes the changes (in percentage points) of the visible partici-
pation and the unemployment rate,  DUM89 represent a dummy variable )1989=1, other
years=0).
Figure 1 – Changes of the Visible (or Actual) Participation Rate and the Unemployment Rate
(ILO-concept) in EU–15









a According to ILO-Concept. - Source: Compare Labour Market Balance Sheet
aAccording to ILO-Concept.
Source: Compare Labour Market Balance Sheet for EU–15.
The estimation of the maximum labour force that includes hidden unemployment during the
period 1985–2000 is done in two steps:
1. In the first step, the pronounced cyclical fluctuations of the visible participation rate are
eliminated to a high degree (but not totally) via the application of an HP(Hodrick-
Prescott)-filter (100). The reasoning behind this procedure is that the short-term varia-
tions in employment are mainly echoed in the changes of regular (ILO-concept) unem-
ployment, whereas hidden unemployment is believed to show a lower cyclical re-
sponsiveness to varying labour market conditions. This in turn has to be seen against the
background of the assumption that hidden unemployment in most EU-15 countries
represents predominantly female discouraged workers, i.e. women who withdraw from
the labour market in cyclical downswings or recessions, and who re-enter the labour
market when employment conditions improve.
4
 This effect is believed to be much greater
than the additional worker effect, which exerts its influence just in the opposite direction.
Naturally, there are no direct estimates available (on a panel basis, for example) for
hidden unemployment in EU-15. However, an indirect approach to estimate at least
roughly the magnitude of this effect may be drawn from the EUROSTAT labour force
samples that show under the heading "inactive population in working age" the subgroup
"persons who wish to be employed". The latter might well be perceived as a rough
indicator for hidden unemployment. It is surely not by chance that about two thirds of this
subgroup are women. From 1995 until 1999, the aforementioned persons represented on
average with more than 8 ½ mill. persons approximately one third of total unemployment
(= sum of ILO-concept and hidden unemployment as defined above).
2. In a second step, the HP-filtered visible participation rate has been increased by 3 ½
percentage points to arrive at the maximum participation rate. This value has not been
chosen arbitrarily, but, in fact, has been orientated at the number of inactive persons in
working age who actually wish to work (see above). The latter are regarded as the
u p p e r limit for hidden unemployment. Thus, to remain on the safe side, the
PP-addendum (+3.5) to the HP-filtered visible participation rate was fixed so that the re-
sulting estimate for hidden unemployment with somewhat more than 8.1 mill. persons or
nearly 32 percent of total unemployment (Æ1995/99) turned out to be a little bit lower
than the figures calculated from the EUROSTAT labour force samples for the same
period (8.5 mill. persons or slightly less than 33 percent of total unemployment).
Compared with calculations done by Fuchs (2000; p. 12) for the United Kingdom, the
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Elmeskov and Pichelman (1993a, pp. 144) came to quite similar conclusions for most
OECD-countries („ ... with the notable exception of Japan ...“).
Netherlands and Germany this seems to be a rather conservative estimate: whereas Fuchs
arrives at a ratio of hidden to registered (Germany) or to ILO-unemployment
(Netherlands, UK) within the range of about 0.6 to 1.4 in recent years, we get even some-
what less than 0.5.
The main results derived from the estimation procedure described above are shown in Figure 2.
On the basis of yearly changes, the character of hidden unemployment as a cyclical less
responsive component of total unemployment (as compared with "open unemployment") seems
to be well documented, letting apart the aberrations in 1988/89 which may be due mainly to
errors in variables.
Already during the period 1985–2000, the rising participation rate turns out to be the dominant
factor for the increase in labour supply (contributing roughly three quarters of total growth),
whereas the weight of the demographic factor has become more and more smaller. Splitting up
the participation rate according to sex, rising female labour participation in the northern as well
as in the southern regions of EU-15 had to bear the brunt of this development.
5
 But since about
the mid-nineties, also the participation rate for males has increased again
6
 — among others due
to a cutback in public programs for earlier pensioning which had been used especially during
and after the recession of 1993 to solve structural problems in shrinking „old industries“ as
well as to improve job opportunities for young entrants to the labour market, since in many
countries of EU-15 high youth unemployment is a very severe social problem.
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According to EUROSTAT the female participation rate in the age group 15–64 years in EU–
15 climbed from 49.7 per cent in 1995 to 52.6 percent in 1999.
6
Following EUROSTAT the male participation rate for men aged 15–64 years averaged 69.9
percent in 1995/97. Thereafter it picked up to 71.6 percent in 1999.
Figure 2 – Comparison between the Absolute Changes of Employment, Unemployment and
Estimated Hidden Unemployment in EU–15













a According to ILO-Concept. - Source: Compare Labour Market Balance Sheet
aAccording to ILO-Concept.
Source: Compare Labour Market Balance Sheet for EU–15.
2.2 Preparing a Conditional Forecast until 2020
In the following we undertake to establish a long-term forecast of our own of the EU-15 labour
market balance. The primary aim of this forecast is not in the predictive sector. In this respect,
the only prerequisite of our scenario is that it is lying within a range of alternative scenarios
which are all realistic in the sense that their probability to happen in the future is positively and
significantly different from zero. Thus the ultimate aim of our forecast is to demonstrate the
close interactions between the trends in demography (including migration), in education and in
the labour market of EU-15.
Since so far there seems to be no detailed demographic model available for EU-15 as a whole,
we had to retreat in preparing the demographic forecast to the utmost rough approach — namely
making assumptions for the natural population increase (crude birth and death rates) and for net
immigration. The only alternative would have been population projections given by
EUROSTAT
7
 which do rely on national forecasts under very different assumptions and which
are starting in different base years (from 1995 to 1998). We have used the aforementioned
forecasts only indirectly in projecting the age structure of the population until 2020. The scope
of these national forecasts seems to concentrate mainly on the demographic sector — namely to
show how much the domestic population in working age will shrink or how fast the age burden
will grow if both developments are not coped partly by an increasing net immigration. Thus cu-
mulating the national assumptions about net immigration for EU-15 yields a decline from nearly
700,000 persons (average 1995/2000) to only 500,000 in 2020. From an economic point of
view (migration theory; social policy) such an assumption does not seem to be sustainable
mainly for two reasons:
– The prospective enlargement of the European Union in 2004 by at least five Eastern
European Countries will attract additional immigration into EU-15 (especially during the
years from about 2005 until 2010) as it had been the case in the eighties when Spain and
Portugal entered the EU.
8
– The future decline of the domestic EU-15-population in working age as well as the impact
of the fast growing age burden, which both represent an intertwined severe problem for
the whole social security system, should increase net immigration into EU-15 even
further, i.e. beyond 2010.
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EUROSTAT (2000, pp. 123).
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The European Integration Consortium (Boeri et al. 2000) arrives, with the help of
econometrically underpinned investigations about immigration caused by EU–enlargement
by Eastern European countries, at the conclusion that emigration from these countries to EU–
15 would culminate during about the first ten years after EU-accession of MEE-countries
(MEE: Mid Eastern European).
2.2.1 Assumptions and Results of the Demographic Scenario
The crude birth rate (see Table 1, Part 1) will continue its decline which could already be
observed during the nineties throughout the whole forecasting period. The negative impact of
the worsening overall age structure as well as the accelerating fall in the number of women in
childbearing age can be only partially compensated for by a moderate increase in net
reproduction rates of women, for example in Italy or Spain (as is optimistically shown in
national forecasts). Crude death rates should remain more or less stable at least until 2015,
since the negative effect of the ageing of the total population will be neutralized (as in recent
years) by a steadily growing life expectancy. Thereafter, when the first cohorts of the post-war
baby boom generation will reach the age of 60–65 years, this could marginally outweigh the
positive life expectancy growth-effect with the result of a slight rise in the crude death rate.
Thus, the natural population increase (excess of live births over the number of deaths), which
during the period 1995–2000 had been above 300,000 persons (annual average), should
become increasingly negative from 2010 onwards (average 2010/2015: nearly –
180,000 persons; 2015/2020: –315,000 persons). The Achilles heel of every population
projection is net immigration which, as a  rule, is extremely volatile since it is affected by a
wide range of economic, political and social factors — let alone civil wars motivated by
multiethnic problems.
9
 As outlined above, under such conditions we should confine ourselves
to economic and foreseeable political (enlargement of EU-15) factors, which in this case both
point into the same direction: the rapid ageing (which is already under way) and the expected
shrinking of the domestic EU-15-work force should attract more and more immigrants even
under the risk that future problems of integration of the migrants might (but must not!) become an
even more sensitive political issue than in the past. Accordingly, it is assumed that net
immigration into EU-15 will rise from an average of nearly 700,000 persons in 1995/2000 to a
maximum of 900,000 persons in 2020. This is a rather conservative hypothesis in view of the
aforementioned shrinking process of the domestic population. It enables the total population of
EU-15 to increase further until 2020, but with a declining rate of growth: decade 1990–2000:
3.5 percent; 2000–2010: 2.3 percent; 2010–2020: 1.5 percent.
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The consequences of the civil war in the former Yugoslavia during recent years provide a by
no means excessive example.
The future changes in the age structure  of the EU-15-population are roughly in line with those
given in the national forecasts which are compounded by EUROSTAT. The differences are
stemming exclusively from the assumption of a higher net immigration as discussed above. For
the whole forecasting period (2000–2020) the cumulated difference in the assumptions between
the "national" and our forecast arrives at nearly 5 mill. persons. Only a very small minority of
these should be in the age group "65 years and older". Most of them will be in working age
(labour migration). In the case of permanent immigration migrants will be accompanied by
spouses and children, so that at least 20 to 25 percent of them should be younger than 15 years.
According to these assumptions we have corrected approximately upwards the percentages
given in the national forecasts for the age groups "less than 15 years" and "15–64 years". This
in turn resulted in a somewhat lower percentage (as compared with the EUROSTAT
calculations from national projections) for the age group "65 years and older". As can be seen
from Table 1, Part 2, under these conditions the number of persons in working age will rise
until 2015, but with a declining growth rate. From 2015 onwards, a steep decline takes place.
This development should be seen against the background of a rapid ageing process within the
group 15–64 years old which will become most dramatic from 2015 onwards. This may also
implicitly be derived from the steadily diminishing number of persons under 15 years old who
must be seen as a rough indirect indicator for the future influx into the "working age group" as
well as from the ever rising number of persons aged 65 and over. The massive inflow into this
age group mirrors to a considerable extent the outflow from the "working age group".
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In Part 3 of Table 1 we have tried to calculate at least approximately the impact of the
educational system on the work force. A rapidly ageing society like the one of EU-15 which is
forced to cope successfully with the consequences of globalization has no other choice but to
increasingly invest in an improvement of the skills/qualifications of its work force. The higher
the average educational standard, the greater are later on the chances for additional training on
the job or, which seems to be much more important in the future, for the change into another job.
This tendency has become already apparent in the past: during the base period 1985–2000 the
percentage of persons in working age who visited schools of secondary stage II (according to
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That, especially in recent years, a growing number of scholars at secondary stage II and of
students has been entering the work force temporarily will be discussed later in the section
2.2.2.
the "International Standard Classification for Education by the UNESCO") increased only from
7.2 to an estimated 8.0, whereas the attendance of high schools and universities rose much
faster from 3.2 to an estimated 5.2 percent. We expect this trend to continue until 2020. But at
the same time much effort should be devoted to shorten the average time span, especially for
achieving a university's degree. Hence, the future growth of the "students percentage" might
well slow down somewhat until 2020. The implications of the latter assumption (shorter
average duration to reach a university's degree) should not be overlooked: less chances for
students to participate temporarily in the work force (this item will be discussed later under
2.2.3).
As can be seen from Table 1, Part 4, the growth in the number of persons in working age,
excluding scholars and students (it shall be denominated here as the "nucleus work force" –
NWF), will diminish strongly until 2015 (the "interim high" during the period 2005–2010 stems
from the assumption of a temporarily higher net immigration as a consequence of
EU-enlargement by eastern European countries). From 2015 onwards, NWF is forecast to
shrink sharply — despite an allowance made for net immigration of more than 850,000 persons
annually. This should have severe repercussions on the labour market which shall be analyzed
in the following chapter.
2.2.2 Impact of Population Ageing and Shrinking on the European Union's Aggregate
Labour Market
To get a first grasp of the main determinants of labour demand we have estimated a simple log-
linear employment equation for Euroland for the period 1987–2000 with the aid of OLS. The
results do not seem to be unreasonable. The elasticity with respect to the activity term (real
GDP) is 1.0 and with respect to real wage costs –0.5. Moreover, autonomous technical
progress, the influence of which had been captured by a linear time trend, would reduce total
employment by 1 percentage point per annum. If we now take a somewhat optimistic stance and
assume a growth rate of 2 ½ percent for real GDP in EU-15 from 2000 until 2020 (that means
we exclude the possibility of deep and/or prolonged future recessions like the one of 1992/93),
and if we furthermore stick to a continuing modest growth of real wage costs as in recent years
(+½ percent annually), total employment in EU-15 would grow by 1.25 percent [2.5–
(0.25+1.0)].
11
 Under these conditions, total employment in EU-15 in 2020 would slightly
exceed a level of 205 mill. persons (2000: 158.5 mill. persons). To achieve this the maximum
participation rate, in view of a progressively declining NWF (for definition see above), must
go up tremendously to 93.6 percent which is completely unrealistic since so far no allowance
has been made for open (ILO) and hidden unemployment. If the assumptions about real GDP
growth and autonomous technical progress are left unchanged, we have to concentrate any
efforts for a better balancing of supply and demand on the future EU-15 labour market at the
really scarce production factor — namely labour itself. Accordingly, the price for labour (real
wage costs) should grow much faster until 2020 than in the recent past. To avoid a sudden
upward leap in real wage costs (RWC) which causes unnecessary disturbances in the employ-
ment forecast, the growth rate of RWC will be increased step by step from about 0.5 percent
(average 2000/2003) over 1 percent (2005) to 2 percent from 2010 onwards. This reduces the
growth rate of employment from 1.7 percent (average 2000/2004) over 1 percent in 2005 to
0.5 percent from 2010–2020.
As a result, total productivity per person in employment (employees plus self-employed) would
grow much faster from 2010–2020 (by 2 percent) than in the base period (1.1 percent on
average for the period 2000 until 2004). Since autonomous technical progress had been
assumed constant (see above), this is almost exclusively a wage-driven rise in productivity
growth. It is beyond the scope of this investigation to answer the difficult question whether a
rapidly ageing work force would really be able to increase its productivity so much during a
relatively short time span. Our revised employment forecast for 2020 (nearly 185 mill. persons)
is about 10 percent or 20 mill. persons lower than the former "low-wage forecast" (Table 1,
Part 5). This in turn gives room for adequate estimations of open (ILO) and hidden
unemployment in 2020. The scenario which we have developed for this purpose is as follows:
– It should be clear from the above that in 2020, conditional on the assumptions that have
been made, EU-15 will be a full-employment economy. This does not mean that either
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Autonomous technical progress is presumed to exert its influence on employment until 2020
in the same way as in the past.
open or hidden unemployment should become a quantité néglieable. At first, especially in
such a heterogeneous, multilingual region as in EU-15, there will always be a certain
amount of unemployment which is due to the high fluctuations on the regional labour
markets (i.e. stocks are rather small in relation to changes). Secondly, and much more
important, full employment can only bring cyclical unemployment to zero, whereas
structural unemployment (for example, a mismatch due to inadequate skills) will remain
more or less unaffected. Thus, we suppose that even under such extremely favourable
labour market conditions as the ones forecast for 2020 open (ILO) unemployment in
France, Italy, the United Kingdom or Germany will not fall much below 1–1 ½ mill. in
either country. For EU-15 as a whole, structural open unemployment as well as open
unemployment due to fluctuations will add up to not less than 7 ½ mill. persons or less
than half of total ILO unemployment in 1999. This is no more than a first rough country-
by-country guess, the risks of which are clearly lying on the low side.
– As far as hidden unemployment is concerned we even do not know if it contains a
structural component at all. Theoretically the discouraged worker concept which figures
so prominently in explaining hidden unemployment would exclude a structural element. At
least for Germany this is further underpinned by empirical evidence which shows that
rather often female discouraged workers have above average skills. Hence, we should be
cautious and assume for 2020 only a fluctuation component for hidden unemployment
which is put rather arbitrarily at 2 ½ mill. persons or only slightly more than one third of
total estimated hidden unemployment in 1999. Again, as in the case of open
unemployment, the risks of this estimate should be on the low side.
According to the above estimates total (open and hidden) unemployment in 2020 will equal
(7 ½+2 ½ =) 10 mill. persons or 42.5 percent of the 1999-level. The ILO unemployment rate
for 2020 is calculated at 3.9 percent (1999: 9.4 percent) and it seems to be at first glance
compatible with a full-employment rate. But also the total unemployment rate (including hidden
unemployment) signals full employment (5.1 percent in 2020 as compared with 13.2 percent in
1999; see Table 1, Part 6).
12
 Adding total unemployment estimated for 2020 to the total
employment estimate restricted by increasing wage pressure (see above) yields a forecast of the
maximum work force in 2020 in EU-15 of somewhat less than 195 mill. persons (1999:
179 mill.; +8.5 percent; Table 1, Part 6). From this follows a maximum participation rate of
88.8 percent in 2020. This is a considerable gain of 7 percentage points as compared with
1999. But the average annual increase from 2000 until 2020 (0.34 percentage points) is well in
line with the development during the base period. Moreover, it should be taken into
consideration that the acceleration of real wage growth (see above) provides a positive
stimulus for a rising participation rate, especially during the period 2010–2020. But
nevertheless a participation rate approaching 90 percent seems to be an extremely high level
even for a full-employment economy. This is ultimately the crucial result of our forecast of the
labour market balance for EU-15. Hence, it will be discussed in the following section if a
participation rate of nearly 90 percent in 2020 is feasible.
2.2.3 Discussion of Results
Participation rates on the macrolevel in a range from 85 to 90 percent remind of the conditions
in socialist economies like the former GDR. They could only be realized by creating the
necessary infrastructure (for example, a dense network of kindergardens in firms) which allows
women with young children to work. Over and above, there had been also a certain amount of
ideological pressure on women to enter the active part of the population. In market economies,
where there is free choice to work, an important precondition for a further substantial rise in
female labour participation would be in the first instance to encourage in most regions/countries
of EU-15 the creation of private and/or public institutions of professional child care since
family networks will become increasingly thinner in the future due to demographic reasons
(low birth rates in the past). A process already under way in nearly all EU-15-countries is, on
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In the meantime EUROSTAT has prepared, with the aid of „Statistics Netherlands“, a new
long-run conditional prediction of population and labour force until 2050 on a regional
(NUTS-2) basis (EUROSTAT 2001). For three scenarios (high, medium or basic, and low)
the total work force in EU–15 is calculated. Compared with this very detailed predictions
our own forecast of total labour supply is well within the high and the low scenario-range. In
2015 it exceeds only slightly, in 2020 more considerably the level of the EUROSTAT basic
scenario prediction.
the side of enterprises/firms, to offer more part-time and temporary jobs on a flexible basis
13
(to give one practical example: life-time working hour budgets which allow women a flexible
adjustment of their working time to the needs, for example, of child education). A further step in
this direction would be to grant more generous maternity leave benefits or subsidies for better
child care arrangements. There are countries in EU-15 which so far have done a lot in these
fields (for example France), whereas in others there seems to be much room for further
improvements (Germany, Italy or Spain).
14
 For the time being, it is rather unsecure if all or at
least some of the above mentioned measures could be realized until 2020 — but at least this is
not wholly impossible.
Another step on the way to the forecast high participation rate in EU-15 may be seen in further
cutbacks in earlier retirement programs especially for men. Apart from solving severe regional
structural problems, such programmes seem to be counterproductive in times of a shrinking
domestic labour supply. One could go even a step further and envisage the politically very
sensitive issue of a rise in the legal retirement age.
A special methodological problem should also be discussed here — namely the deduction of
all scholars and students in working age from the work force. This is a problematic issue
insofar as in the past it could be observed that a rising part of these scholars and students
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During the years 1998/99 about 45 percent of employment growth in Euroland can be
attributed to part-time and temporary work (European Central Bank, 2000c, pp. 46).
14
Kreyenfeld and Hank (2000, pp. 317–337) have found out with the aid of a multinominal
logit approach that in Western Gemany labour force participation of women with children is
not significantly influenced neither by the availability nor by the cost of public day care for
children. They argue that the main reason for this is that the West German public day care
system (private providers do play only a marginal role) is rather uneffective especially with
respect to opening hours. We should add that it is very unevenly distributed over the country.
Improving the whole system should therefore contribute much to facilitate labour
participation of women with children in a world where the reliance on family networks
becomes more and more difficult. Under such conditions it is not surprising that even for the
costs of public day child care no statistically significant, negtive impact on labour
participation of women with children could be detected (these costs can be economically
perceived as a reduction of the wage income of the aforementioned women). Thus the
number and the age of the children, the income of the partner and the educational degree
figure most prominently in influencing part- and full-time employment of women with
children in Western Germany.
entered the labour force temporarily (during holidays, for example). If they get a job, they are
counted twice in the Labour Market Balance — as scholars/students and at the same time as an
employee. Thus, the calculated participation rate is systematically overestimated. Since there
are no separate data available about this special subgroup of employees, we can do nothing to
improve the situation. But when interpreting the very high maximum participation rate for 2020
this issue should be taken into consideration: the maximum participation rates estimated for the
second half of the nineties are already in a very high range (80–82 percent) which is predomi-
nantly caused by the above mentioned "scholar/student effect" (SSE). In the future, the
SSE-effect is believed to increase further, but at a somewhat lower rate than in the past since
we have assumed (see above) a shortening of the average duration of the studying time in some
important EU-15-countries like especially Germany. Nevertheless taking the SSE-factor into
account a maximum participation rate approaching 90 percent in 2020 seems to be not
completely beyond the horizon.
But we may not conclude this discussion without putting a big question mark behind our rather
conservative assumptions about future net immigration into EU-15. All the above points to the
possibility of allowing for a substantially higher net immigration (one million or more annually
as during the period of the fall of the "iron curtain" around 1990) into EU-15. The prospective
enlargement of EU-15 by eastern European countries should provide a favourable chance for
this. This should be the more the case as one can expect that especially immigrants from these
countries should turn to EU-15 who for many reasons would be prepared to integrate
themselves with no major problems into the recipient countries and who will acquire in a rather
short time the necessary skills. This item will be discussed in more detail in the following
simulation experiment.
2.3 Scenario for Europe’s Aggregate Labour Market in the Medium Term:
Prospective Enlargement of the EU by East European Countries
The envisaged entry of especially Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia and Slovenia
to the EU could spur labour migration to EU–15 countries, mainly to Germany, France, the
United Kingdom, the Scandinavian countries (Estonia) and Austria (Slovenia). Thus it may be
appropriate to assume as a hypothetical scenario that net immigration forecast in the first draft
of the EU–15-labour market balance (LMB)
15
 with a yearly average of 440,000 persons during
2000–2005 (basic scenario) will increase by an additional 500,000 persons per year from the
above mentioned eastern European countries (in the following denoted as the EEIS scenario). In
reality we believe that especially permanent net immigration from eastern Europe should be
considerably lower than the 2 ½ mill. assumed in the EEIS-scenario for the total period 2000–
2005.
16
 But for demonstration purposes such a magnitude has the advantage that the secondary
effects of this assumption will not become too small. One illustrative example is provided by
hidden unemployment which normally is only a minor fraction of total immigration and which at
the same time as an estimated variable is subject to a rather large error margin.
In the following the structural assumptions underlying the EEIS-scenario will be commented
briefly before the results are discussed.
– Main characteristics of migrants: Especially highly motivated labour migrants with their
families will come who have, thanks to above average, specific vocational skills, good
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This had already been done on the basis of the first draft of the LMB. An "update" of this
simulation experiment using the second current draft under the same assumptions would have
delivered only marginally different results. Thus, we see no urgent reason to prepare another
simulation experiment on the basis of the second draft of the LMB.
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The lion's share of prospective immigrants from eastern Europe is expected to come from
Poland. According to estimates given in a report of the Polish Labour Ministry, after
accession to EU at the beginning of the year 2004 between 300,000 and 700,000 persons
might emigrate to EU-15-countries. Main determinants of the number of emigrants is the
development of the situation on the Polish labour market between now and 2004 (Aktuelt.dk-
Nyhederne på nettet, 16 October 2000: Polakker vil emigrere til EU (Ritzau)). In a more
recent inquiry it turned out that nearly a third of the adult Poles takes at least into
consideration to search for labour in EU–15 after the accession of Poland — among them
mainly young people who are at the beginning of their vocational or high school/university
education. This has to be seen before the background of a continous upward trend in the
Polish unemployment rate (to nearly 16 percent in spring of this year) since the mid-nineties
(hhtp:// de.news.yahoo.com/010423/3/1ju7y.html), which can be interpreted as an important
push factor within the context of migration theory. — Boeri et al (2000) estimate, mainly on
the basis of an econometic model applied to migration into Germany from 1967 to 1998, that
in the first years after a hypothetical accession of all ten MEE-countries, immigration into
EU–15 could amount to 335 000 pers. per annum — in our view a rather cautious estimate.
chances to find a job at least in the medium term on the EU–15 labour market.
17
 More
often than not an at least basic knowledge of the language spoken in the country of
destination is presumed to be available.
– Age structure: It is assumed to be similar to the one which had been characteristic for
ethnic Germans coming from Poland, Romania and the CIS-countries from 1988 until
1992.
18
 Thus the age structure of the prospective immigrants would be significantly more
favourable than the one of the EU–15 population in the basic scenario (much higher
percentage of people in best working age; elder people (65 years and over) will be
under-, children (less than 15 years) will be overrepresented).
– Birth rates: After the fall of the iron curtain and the introduction of a market economy in
the former socialist countries of eastern Europe crude birth rates experienced a
considerable decline. The most dramatic and world-wide unique example in this respect
is provided by eastern Germany where crude birth rates more than halved from 1989 until
1992. Before that time they were on average higher in eastern Europe than in the EU–15
population. Thus it is believed that it is not unrealistic to assume that, especially during
the first years after arrival, the crude birth rates of the immigrant families from eastern
Europe will at best reach the EU–15 level.
– Death rates: Due to the more "juvenile age structure" of the immigrant families their crude
death rates will be considerably lower than the ones in EU–15. Hence, the crude death
rates applied in the EEIS-scenario have to be corrected increasingly downwards, starting
in the year 2000. Since in relation to the total population in EU–15 the prospective
immigrant population from eastern Europe will even in the final year 2000 be only a
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The already mentioned report of the Polish Labour Ministry expects that the majority of
emigrants to EU-15 will be members of the rapidly growing middle class of the country.
Such emigrants are believed to be normally very well educated, and they should have indeed
above average vocational skills.
18
During the average of the years 1996/99 nearly one third (one half) of immigrating ethnic
Germans had been in the age of less than 18 years (18–45 years), whereas the elderly (age
group 60 years and more) accounted only for about 10 percent of the total (Info-Service
Ethnic Germans (ed.), Federal Ministry of the Interior, no. 110, January 2001).
minor fraction, this downward correction is in fact so small that is more of a symbolic
character.
– Participation rates in the educational system: The participation rates of the east European
immigrants in work force age in the educational system should well exceed the ones for
the EU–15 population mainly as a direct consequence of the much more favourable age
structure. Moreover, language barriers are expected to be overcome rather quickly. The
higher the vocational skills of the parent generation in the country of origin (not
withstanding the fact that the parent generation might often be forced to work in EU–15
below their formal skills achieved in the home country),
19
 the more on average the young
generation will be felt itself driven to try to reach a more advanced educational standard
in EU–15. This is a typical phenomenon which has often been observed in the past in the
case of skilled labour migration (immigrant families from Europe or South East Asia in
the US, Canada and Australia provide a good example).
20
 Thus the participation rates of
the population in working age in the educational system should be revised increasingly
upwards in the case of the EEIS-scenario in spite of the fact that the amount of this
revision in percentage points is again very small (see above).
– Maximum Participation Rate (MPR): The MPR calculated for the basic version of the
EU–15-LMB is deliberately left unchanged in the EEIS-scenario. As a first guess this
seems to be appropriate insofar as we can put forward only vague theoretical and/or
speculative arguments for in any case minor upward revisions of the overall MPR
following mainly from the more favourable age structure of the east European immigrant
work force.
Concerning the results of the EEIS-scenario as compared with the basic scenario (no additional
influx of eastern Europeans into EU–15 due to the prospective enlargement by Poland, Czech
Republic, Hungary, Estonia and Slovenia) see Table 2. Total labour supply will increase under
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See also Boeri et al. (2000).
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Compare for example: Basavasajappa et al. (1993, pp. 60–66, see especially Table 33,
p. 65); Fawcett et al. (1990); Stark (1991, pp. 371–380); Borjas et al. (1991, pp. 15–26);
Seifert (1994, pp. 76–92).
the EEIS-scenario by somewhat more than 1 mill. persons than in the basic scenario. This
seems at first glance rather modest when confronted with the additional resident population in
EU–15 (+2 ½ mill.) stemming from the assumed total influx of migrants from eastern Europe.
But it has to be recognized that more than 36 percent are accounted for by children (under 15
years) and by the elderly (³ 65 years), where children alone dominate with nearly one fifth. A
further nearly 10 percent in work force age are absorbed by the educational system.
As far as labour demand is concerned, the mechanism of the LMB is such that the forecast of
total employment and registered unemployment has to be carried out i n d e p e n d e n t l y
from the supply side (Estimated Maximum Labour Force). Thus we get in a first step the
economically meaningless result that all the additional increase in the total work force
according to the EEIS-scenario is transferred to hidden unemployment. Hence, in a second step
the forecast of total employment and registered unemployment performed in the basic scenario
has to be revised upwards so as to include the greatest part of the work force increase in the
EEIS-scenario, leaving only the rest for hidden unemployment. This is done by an iterative
procedure. From traditional employment/unemployment forecasts it differs only insofar as in the
present case we have a strict upper limit (Maximum Work Force) as well as the guidelines
provided by cyclical and trend developments in the distribution of total unemployment on its
open and hidden component in the basic forecast.
According to our assumptions (see above) the majority of adult male (and often also female)
immigrants from Eastern Europe will highly skilled workers/specialists who, after a rather
short phase of training on EU–15-standards and of overcoming language deficits, should
succeed in finding a job. Thus, after about 1–2 years their employment rate is expected to be
higher than the one of the EU–15-work force in the basic scenario. Correspondingly, their
unemployment rate should be much lower. Even many women who have to care for children
aged under 15 years might well be "labour-market-oriented". But mainly due to their time-
budget constraints they may often be forced to stay in hidden unemployment for some years.
Accordingly, the percentage of the additional work force under the EEIS scenario remaining in
hidden unemployment should be clearly above the average for EU–15 in the basic scenario.
Table 2 – Differences between the EEIS-scenario and the Basic Forecast for EU–15 from
1999 until 2005 (in 1,000 persons)
Population:
total: + 2,521
less than 15 years old: + 487
15–64 years old: + 1,600
65 years and more: + 434
Educational System:
scholars at secondary stage II: + 137
students at universities and high schools: + 91
Persons aged 15–64 years who are neither scholars nor
students: (+ 1,226)a
Labour Market:
estimated maximum labour force: + 1,039
total employmentb: + 961
unemployment (open; according to ILO-criteria)b: + 36
estimated hidden unemploymentb: + 42
total unemploymentb: + 78
Unemployment rate (ILO): – 0.01c
Estimated total unemployment rated: – 0.01c
aSmoothed series. – bIndependent estimate. – cPercentage points. – dOwn estimate (total
unemployment as percent of maximum labour force).
Source: Compare EU–15-labour market balance; own estimates and calculations.
Under these conditions more than 90 percent of the additional work force in the EEIS-scenario
are supposed to find a job in EU–15. With 7 ½ percent their total unemployment rate
(3.5 percent for open and 4.0 percent for hidden unemployment) will be far below the one for
the EU–15-work force in the basic scenario (9.1 percent for total unemployment and 6.1 percent
for open unemployment). Similar to the Ethnic German immigrants in the years 1988–1992 the
main price many of them have to pay for this performance is an occupation more or less below
their formal vocational skills in the country of origin. But even such disadvantages might be
overcome after some years.
3. Labour Participation and Unemployment: Empirical Evidence
The crucial question with regard to economic policy is whether or not there is a link between
unemployment and labour force participation. The time-series analysis of the previous chapter
is far too much aggregated to detect such a link. Hence, in the following panel estimation
techniques will be used to figure out whether or not the correlation between the two variables
is positive or negative.
3.1 Unemployment Changes, Participation Rate Changes, and the Stance of the
Business cycle
Figure 3 exhibits the link between the changes in the unemployment rates and the labour force
participation rates in the European union for males and females respectively. The plot reveals
that the overall correlation across the member states of the European Union is negative rather
than positive. An increase in the participation rates, therefore does not point to an subsequent
rise in the unemployment rate. This result does hold for males as well as for females. However,
it is not quite clear how the unemployment rate should be interpreted in this context. On the one
hand it can be seen as a measure of the labour markets shortcomings as an indicator for excess
supply and frictional elements of the labour markets, on the other hand it may be well
characterizing the stance of the business cycle. If the latter is the case, the positive correlation
reveals that the participation rate is partly of cyclical nature. To shed light on this question, we
have compared the overall participation rates for the countries under investigation with a
measure of the business cycle. In particular the output gap defined as the deviation of real GDP
from its trend has been used. It turned out that the cyclical influence on the participation rate
varies heavily across countries.
21
 In some prominent cases the participation rate seems to
follow the output gap very closely. In particular, in Italy the correlation is very high. In most of
the other countries, however, the participation rate is more or less independent from the
business cycle.
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 The figures are available upon request from the authors.
Figure 3 – Change of Labour Force Participation and Unemployment Rates in Percentage
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3.2 Possible Econometric Specifications
In the long run, the labour supply (LS) is equal to the underlying labour supply (LS*), supposed
to be exogenous. On the past, LS* is calculated by smoothing effective participation rates (by
sex and age). These smoothed participation rates are applied to the population figures by sex
and age. The estimated equation, for every age group and sex, is:
(2) D D DLS LS E ut t t t= + - +a a
* ( )1
where LS is the effective labour supply, LS* the underlying labour supply and E the
employment.
In projection, underlying participation rates by sex and age are extrapolated according to a
logistic method with assumptions about maximum (upper limits) participation rates and LS* by
sex and age is obtained by applying these extrapolated rates to population projections by sex
and age.
An alternative specification is proposed by Elmeskov et. al (1993). The labour force
«responsiveness» to employment conditions is revealed by estimating the elasticity of
participation rates with respect to the employment share in the working-age population from
structural participation rate equations. The estimated equation is:
(3) ln ln ln lnPR PR RDI ES t ut t t t t= + + + + +-a a a a a0 1 1 2 3 4
where PR is the participation rate, RDI the real disposable income per head and ES the overall
employment share in working-age population. This estimation can be done by age group and
sex.
Another approach to model the development of the labour force is the approach advocated by
Bloch et al. (1986). They try to split up the evolution of the labour force by sex and age group
into four effects i) the demographic effect ; ii) the structural effect (measured by a time trend);
iii) the institutional effect; iv) the fluctuation effect. The estimated equation therefore is:
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where PR is the participation rate, t represents a time trend equal to 1 for each period, I
represents persons affected by specific measures on employment (like persons on early
retirement) related to working-age people and F represents flexion variables (like the
unemployment rate). The suffix G represents the different age groups.
Last, but not least, it is possible to estimate an error correction model. The long-term
relationship is given by:
(6) ln ln ( ) ln*LS t WAP E ut t t t= + + + - +a a a a0 1 2 21
With this long run relation at hand, we can apply an error correction model of the form:
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where LS and LS* are respectively the labour supply and the underlying labour supply, t a time
trend, WAP the working age population, and E denotes employment. This model allows to
perceive between long run and short run effects of the flexion. We can use this method for an
estimation by sex and age group.
3.3 Empirical Results
At a first glance, the specific influence of labour market measures was neglected. Taking the
unemployment rate as a cyclical variable equation (1) was estimated for a pool of 18 OECD
countries. Adding the cross-section dimension to the equation gives:
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with i as an index for the countries under investigation. The estimation has been done for five
age groups and for male and female persons, respectively. Since the institutional and social
settings are quite different between the countries included in the estimation the fixed effect
model  has been used to allow for a country-specific constant. The results are given in Table 3.
In a nutshell, the coefficient regarding the unemployment rate is negative, that is a higher
unemployment rate has gone in lone with a lower participation rate. Though this result
underscores previous findings (e.g. Elmeskov et al 1993) it is in contrast to widespread beliefs
in the public opinion. It is often argued that high unemployment and high labour force
participation should go hand in hand because a higher labour force would increase the labour
supply. If the demand for labour is restricted for any reason — for example by a too low
demand — this would clearly increase unemployment. The results presented here show that this
view on the labour market is not the correct one. Rather, a good labour market performance
allows both a low unemployment rate and a high labour force participation rate. Though one has
to keep in mind the limits of the data set, the heterogeneity between the countries, and several
econometric shortcomings of this rather simple approach, it is still a challenge for  any
recommendations  to reduce labour force in order to reduce unemployment.
Furthermore, the results are reasonable if the unemployment rate is mainly seen as a measure of
the business cycle. A better stance of the business cycle means a lower unemployment rate
corresponds with a higher participation rate. This is in line with the statement that persons may
withdraw from the labour market if the economy is in a recession.
As regards the trend variable the coefficients differ sharply between males and females.
Whereas trend influence on male labour participation is negative for all age groups it turns out
to be positive for the two largest females age groups. This might reflect in part the fact that the
political efforts to increase the participation of women in the labour market has been
successful. At a first glance, one might suspect that the estimates for the two youngest female
age groups are at odds with this line of argumentation. However, this not the cast. The negative
trend estimated for younger women's labour market participation is due to a better education
among these group. In particular, younger women stay longer in the education system than
before.
Table 3 – Participation Rate and Unemployment Rate by Sex and Age — Evidence from a
Panel of 18 OECD Countries 1985–1997
Age Group $b 0 $b 1 $b 2 R
2
Males



















































t-values are given in brackets. They are calculated using Heteroskedasticity-Consistent
standard errors as proposed by Withe (1987). *** (**,*) denotes that the coefficient is
significant at the 1(5,10) percent level.
To analyze to what extend the link between the unemployment rate and the participation rate
which has been found in the previous estimation has to be interpreted as a cyclical one in the
next step the equation (5) has been extended to control for the change of real GDP:
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where GDP denotes the growth rate of real GDP in the respective country. The results of this
task are given in Table 4. It turns out that real GDP growth which can be seen as a proxy for
real income growth in this context is only in one case significant different from zero.
Additionally, the sign and the significance of the unemployment rate is not altered by including
the real GDP variable. One might see this as a hint that the close link between unemployment
and participation rates is not predominantly a cyclical one. However, the results have to be
taken with great caution. Since the relation of unemployment and real GDP growth is a close
one too, the outcome might easily stem from multicollinarity problems. Note on the other hand
that the level and not the change of the unemployment rate is included. Therefore, one might
expect the multicollinarity problem to be of limited size only.
Table 4 – Participation Rate, Unemployment Rate, and Real GDP by Sex and Age —
Evidence from a Panel of 18 OECD Countries 1985–1998
Age Group $b 0 $b 1 $b 2 $b 3 R
2
Males







































































t-values are given in brackets. They are calculated using Heteroskedasticity-Consistent
standard errors as proposed by Withe (1987). *** (**,*) denotes that the coefficient is
significant at the 1(5,10) percent level.
The estimations so far have been done using unemployment and participation rates defined in
persons. However, this might well be misleading, since there is a large and growing share of
part time work in the countries under investigation. Therefore, equation (5) is also re-estimated
using the share of part-time work relative to total employment (Part) as an additional variable:
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The results of this exercise are given in Table 5.
Table 5 – Participation Rate, Unemployment Rate, and Part-time Work by Sex and Age —
Evidence from a Panel of 18 OECD Countries 1988–1998
Age Group $b 0 $b 1 $b 2 $b 3 R
2
Males







































































t-values are given in brackets. They are calculated using Heteroskedasticity-Consistent
standard errors as proposed by Withe (1987). *** (**,*) denotes that the coefficient is
significant at the 1(5,10) percent level.
The most striking result coming from these estimations is that female labour force participation
is strongly influenced by the share of part time workers. This points to the fact that women
represent the vast majority of part time workers, whereas full time workers are dominated by
men. Therefore, it is not possible to conclude that the goal of the EU whitebook to achieve a
higher female participation on labour markets has been fulfilled in the last recent years. It might
well be that many women wish to have full employment and find themselves mainly restricted
to part-time or even inferior jobs on the informal sector (grey) of the labour market.
4. Evidence from Individual Countries
4.1 Stylized facts
Since the beginning of the seventies, in Europe and in the United States, activity behaviours
have experienced substantial changes, especially for the young, for women and for the oldest
people. These modifications in  activity behaviour are the result of the conjunction of many
factors, among which social (longer schooling, modification of the role of women in
households...), demographic (decline of the fertility rate, modifications of the age structure...),
institutional (early retirement schemes, change in the age of retirement...)  and / or economic
(level of the rate of unemployment, average income by household, share of part-time
employment in total employment, share of  services sector in the economy...) are the most
important. Consequently, it is necessary to distinguish, for each sex and age groups, what
factors have a preponderant role in the evolution of  active population.
In an international comparison, we can note that the level and the evolution of participation
rates are particular to each country. These disparities are directly linked to the national
institutional arrangements affecting activity, to differences in macroeconomic variables
reflecting the state of labour market, to the peculiarities of the demographic regime and to some
sociocultural factors in each country. Nevertheless, even if each nation has its own evolution of
the labour force, we can easily detect common trends in changes in activity behaviour for the
largest European countries and for the United States during the last three decades.
Our study focuses on the analysis of participation rates for men and women for the six
most important age groups (15-19 years, 20-24 years, 25-54 years, 55-59 years, 60-64 years,
65 years and more) in six countries (France, ex-West Germany, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom
and United States).
4.2 Trends common to every country
Labour force participation rates are relatively inert in the short term.  However, in the long run,
some trends, more or less pronounced according to sex and age, can be recognized. Thus, since
the beginning of the seventies, there is a contrast in activity trends between men and women.
4.2.1 Participation rates of men
If we depict participation rates of males by age groups at three different years (1971, 1984 and
1999), we can observe that in every countries activity behaviour is bell-shaped.
These three charts describe clearly the logic of the bell curve followed by male participation
rates. So, men enter gradually the activity phase when they become 25 years and older among
the age group 25-54 years more than 90 % of the male population is active. This growing
arrival of young people on the labour market coincides with their progressive exit from the
schooling system. In 1999, between 59% (United Kingdom) and more than 70% (France,
Germany) of men being 19 years old stayed in the educative system or in training while for men
24 years old, this figure oscillates between 22% (France) and 36% (Germany)
22
. Nevertheless,
it is necessary to distinguish between two groups of countries
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 These figures come from the labour force survey 1999 of Eurostat
Figure 4 – Male Participation Rates by Age Groups for Selected Countries
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Source : OECD Labour force Statistics
In the first group, composed of Latin countries, there are very few people who are at the same
time in education and in the employment.  On the opposite, in the second group (UK, USA and
Germany), there is an important interaction between education and employment. A lot of people
in professional education or students have mostly temporary jobs.
Within the age group 25 to 54 years old, i.e. more or less at the top of the bell, almost all adult
being present in the labour force. Above 55 years, male participation rates fall more or less
strongly according to the country and the period. Men in the age groups 55-59 and 60-64 years
are particularly sensitive to institutional measures allowing for earlier withdrawals from
activity (early retirement schemes, system of invalidity...). For most countries, the legal
retirement age in public pensioning systems for men is 65 years (except for France : 60 years
since 1983 and for Italy : 62 years since the course of 1990). Beyond this age, labour
participation rates are often marginal except in the United States where the participation rate of
men aged 65 and more was 17% in 1999.
The change of activity behaviour with age, common to all studied countries, should not make
forget the existence of important disparities between countries in participation rates levels of
the same age group. Moreover, even if all curves are bell-shaped, we can observe that for the
two Anglo-Saxon countries, the curves are more smoothed. That means that activity rates are
more uniform with age. Conversely, in France and in Italy, the curve shows a more accentuated
fall for the age group 60 years and more. The obvious main reason for this is the lower legal
retirement age in these countries (see above).
During 30 years, in all countries and for all age groups, male participation rates have fallen
without exceptions. These trends to a decline of men’s labour force participation are
particularly important at the lower and the upper end of active life.
This table shows that the relative declines in participation rates are much more important for
age groups which are not in prime working age (25-54 years). Thus, the most important fall in
the absolute value of the participation rate can be observed for men being 60-64 years old. This
decline of more of 30 points can be explained almost exclusively by the introduction of early
retirement and invalidity schemes initiated to struggle against the high rate of unemployment in
the eighties and nineties in most industrialised countries. For the young people (15 to 24 years)
the decline of the participation rate can be explained by an improved educational level which
means a longer stay at the schooling system. This is mainly motivated by the high rate of youth
unemployment by which move qualified people are less affected than the lesser skilled.











-3.52 pts -13.20 pts -30.36 pts -11.74 pts
In percentage -34.08 % -13.58 % -3.66% -15.16% -44.65% -63.66%
1 West Germany : 1972-1998, Spain:1976-1999 and United Kingdom: 1984-1999 for the 15-19
years old et and 20-24 years old
4.2.2 Participation rates of women
Female participation rates have fundamentally changed during the last 30 years in all countries.
The form of the activity cycle has muted between 1971 and 1999, getting closer to the bell-
shaped type characteristic for men with the years. In the beginning of the seventies, in all
countries, the female participation rate was the highest for the age-group of 20-24 years old.
From 25 years until 35 years old, an important part of women left the labour market to educate
their children and very often stayed out the labour force the rest of their life. From the beginning
of eighties, women’s participation rates tended to increase more and more within the age group
25 years and older. In the economic literature, there are two opposite theories trying to explain
this phenomenon  The first one which, may be interpreted as a rather simple behaviouristic
approach stresses that some exogenous factors like a secular change in attitudes and minds had
reduced the level of the fertility rate. Thus, the resulting reduction of the average size of
families increased the spare time available for women to go on the labour market. Conversely,
the symmetric thesis puts forward arguments for the growing motivations for women to
participate in the labour market with a decline in fertility as consequence. As explain
D.Blanchet and S.Pennec, a lot of economic arguing about demographic behaviour and labour
supply have this optic : the general rise of the employees’ labour productivity which resulted in
higher real wages increased the opportunity cost for women of non-working. This in turn had
consequence as a general switch from the domestic to the market sphere, and the decrease in
birth rates would be one of the consequences.
Another approach considers, according to a model elaborated by E.M.Falaris and H.E.Peters,
that women alter the timing of the first birth and return to work in order to mitigate any adverse
effects of the demographic cycle on their wages profiles. They suggest that individuals born in
different phases of the demographic cycle face different potential wage profiles due to
exogenous shifts in the potential supply of labour. Thus the demographic cycle is the direct
cause of exogenous wage changes which, in turn, alter the labour force participation and
fertility decision of women. According to this paper, the increase of labour force participation
rates of mothers with young children from 1970 to the mid-eighties can be explained by the
incentives to return to work more quickly for women who were born during the upswing of the
demographic cycle since at that time labour supply had been scarce as a consequence, among
others, of the preceding small cohorts (Great Depression 1929/32; impact of World War II),
and labour demand expanded rapidly due to the high economic growth (in Europe, the upswing
of the demographic cycle corresponds to the cohorts of people born between 1950 and 1965).
However, according to the authors, the increase in participation rates of women during the mid-
eighties until now might well have been even larger if women born during the downswing of the
demographic cycle did not have incentives to delay their return to work following childbearing.
These negative incentives stem from the fact that the growth in labour supply was considerably
higher than in the period before because the baby boom generation (see above) had entered the
labour market, which per se lowered job opportunities and depressed real wage growth.
Figure 5: Female Participation Rates by Age Groups for Selected Countries
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Other factors play an important role in the development of female participation rate. One is the
growing tendency for all young women to stay longer in school and at universities to improve
their educational skills. Thereafter, the interest of these women is to realize their human capital
on the labour market. An other factor which contributed, in industrialised countries, to the
growth of the female participation rate is the development of part-time jobs in employment. It
has allowed women with children a better combination of labour participation and child care.
The net increase of the share of jobs in the tertiary sector in employment has also, partly,
contributed to the development of the female activity.  Indeed, women are, in proportion, more
numerous to work in the services sector rather than in industry or agriculture.
4.3 Specific evolution of participation rates to each countries
We can distinguish for our comments four groups of countries classified according to their level
of working age participation rate.
a) Countries of the south of Europe (Italy and Spain) : extremely low female labour
participation
Similar to the other EU-countries, , men being in extremities of the active life have low
participation rates in Italy and Spain (15-24 years old and 55 years old and more). The male
labour force is concentrated essentially in the prime working age (25-54 years). But the main
characteristic of these two countries is the very low level of the labour force participation rates
of women, especially for adult ones in comparison with other industrialised countries (around
60 % in 1999 for Italy and Spain). Moreover, we can observe that the importance of part-time
employment for the total employment is very low (approximately 8% in 1999).
 According to our results of an econometric estimation of the participation rate of females aged
between 25 and 49 in Italy, an increase of approximately 0.8 percentage points in the
participation rate induces a one point rise in the share of part-time in total employment. Thus,
we can suppose that if the share of  part-time jobs would grow to 18%, participation rate of
Italian women aged between 25 and 49 years would be closer to the ones of other industrialised
countries (passing from 60% to 68%) what would correspond to a differential of 800 000
active women in this age group in 2000.
 Figure 6: Male Participation Rates for different Age Groups 1970-1999
 
?








































































































* 25-49 years old











































* 50-59 years old












































































 In the case of Italy and Spain, we can imagine that an encouragement to the part-time
employment could favour the entry on the labour market of women that otherwise would stay
outside because of the impossibility to reconcile a full time job with their traditional activities
within the families.
 Labour force participation rates of Spanish men aged 55 years and more have particularly
declined during the last 25 years. The share of active persons in the population of men being
55-59 years old has decreased more than 15% between 1976 and 1994-1995, whern the rate of
unemployment has reached a record level (23.7% in 1994). Since that period, the males being
55-59 years old showed an increasing participation rate. According to econometric estimations,
we conclude that this category of population is sensitive to the situation of the labour market,
what explains partly the rise of participation  rate of men 55-59 years old with the progressive
decline of the overall rate of unemployment. We observe that for men of 60-64 years old, the
participation rate has been practically divided by two, passing from more than 70 percent to 40
percent between 1976 and 1999. For men aged 65 years and more, we get the impressive
observation , that their participation in the labour market has been fallen by about 90 percent in
less of 25 years.
 In Spain, the normal retirement age is 65, but early retirement at age 60 is permitted for those
who became affiliated to SS before 1967. In 1997, more than one third of those who retire
under the general scheme took advantage of this possibility. As it is explained by M.Boldrin et
al., the current legislation distinguishes between two cases. The first one, representing the vast
majority of those currently retiring between age 60 and 65, is the case of workers who started
contributing as dependent employees to “Mutualidad Laboral” before 1967. In this case, the
replacement rate is reduced by 8 percentage points for each year under age 65. The decision for
a 60-65 years old person either to work further or to become early retired is focused on the
table of replacement rates by age and number of years of contribution. Thus, for example, there
is a different incentive to work an extra year for a person aged 60 and another aged 65, both
with 34 years of contribution. In the former case, the pension increases from 56.8 to 68 percent
of the benefit base, while in the latter it only increases from 98 to 100 percent.
 Figure 7: Female Male Participation Rates for different Age Groups 1970-1999
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 Source : OECD Labour Force Statistics
 The second case, representing about 10 percent of the early retirees, is the case of workers with
dangerous or unhealthy jobs, or workers who were laid off for industrial restructuring regulated
by special legislation. In this case, no reduction applies.









































source : OFCE calcul 
*source : OECD 
 Unless there are collective agreements that prescribe mandatory retirement, individuals may
continue working after age 65. At least for those individuals who have already reached 35
years of contribution at the age of 65, there is no direct incentive for delaying retirement,. For
those with less than 35 years of contribution, a very small direct incentive to postpone
retirement is provided by the fact the ratio of the pension to the benefit base grows 2 percentage
points per year of contribution until reaching 100 percent.
 Contrary to Spain, in Italy, participation rates of men aged 60 and more have declined
relatively little from 1971 to 1999. It is important to note that this age group has clearly
improved its relative position  in comparison with other countries. Italian men aged 60 years
and more had been largely the most inactive persons in the beginning of the seventies.
Nowadays, participation rates of men 60–64 years old and over 65 years are well above the
ones for France and stay at the same level as in West Germany.
 In Italy, two reforms of the retirement system (1992 : Amato reform and 1995 : Dini reform)
continue to have an impact on participation rates of older workers. Before these reforms, the
earning related pension system was characterised by two sources of benefits : old-age pensions
and seniority. The old-age pension was determined by the number of contribution years (at the
most 40) multiplied by 2 percent rate per year of contribution and by the reference wage (last
wage for administration workers, average wage of the last five years for employees of the
private sector and average income of the last ten years of activity for independent workers).
The retirement age was 55 for women and 60 for men, but there was lot of derogatory rules.
 The seniority benefit could be obtained in full for private workers after 35 years of contribution
irrespective of the actual age. For public workers, the rules permitted to obtain full seniority
benefits after 20 years of work (15 years for married women).
 The Amato reform modified partially these rules. The retirement age had to be increased from
55 to 60 years for women and from 60 to 65 years for men, in the rhythm of one year each two
years. The calculation of the average wage for workers of the private sector had to be done
progressively on the last 10 years.
 As is explained by A.Brugiavini, the second reform (Dini reform) changed more deeply the
system, especially with respect to the rules of pension calculation. The contributions paid
during the course of the career are fictitiously capitalised to the rhythm of GDP growth, and, in
the moment of liquidation, are converted in an annual pension with a coefficient that depends on
the age of departure. These coefficients are established on an actuarial basis, that takes into
account the average duration of the retirement, adjusted according to the increase in life
expectancy. The rise of the age of retirement to 60 years for women and to 65 years for men
still holds, but it will be possible, in the new system, to retire at the age from 57 years onwards.
The coefficient of  the annual pension calculation increases between 57 and 65 years,  but
beyond 65 years remains unchanged. Finally, the liquidation remains possible before 57 years,
to the applicable rate of this age, but the person has to provide 40 years of contribution.
 These reforms of the Italian retirement system will have an impact in the long term on
participation rates of persons being between 55 and 65 years old.  The participation rate of 50-
59 years old males which has fallen is expected to stabilise and even to ascend in coming
years, since few individuals will be able to provide 40 years of contribution payment before
becoming 60 years old. Moreover, the Dini reform of the Italian system in standardising rules of
pension calculation of the different regimes limits considerably the number of early retirements
by the way of seniority pensions.
b) France : wide differences in activity rates according to age groups
In France, there is an important contrast in participation rate levels between the 25-54 age
group and the others. Actually, if we have a look on the evolution of participation rates
according to age group in 1999, we find that the form of the French activity curve is very
specific in comparison with others industrialised countries, active persons being essentially
concentrated in prime working age. The participation rates of French men and women aged
between 25 and 54 are the highest of the six studied countries but inversely, participation rates
of young and older French people are the lowest of industrialised countries.
Opposite to Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States where there is an important
number of persons combining a job and an education (4/5 of 15-19 years old people in
employment are at the same time either in school or in professional education), in Latin
countries and especially in France, the low participation rates of young people correspond to a
lengthening of full time studying.
Since the beginning of the seventies, there has been a surprising decline in participation rates of
French men being 55 years old and elder and women being 60 years old and elder. Actually, the
setting up of  early retirement schemes in the sixties, their fast development since the end of the
seventies and also the decrease of the legal age of retirement to 60 years in 1983 explain, to a
great extent, this fall of labour force participation of elder workers.
During the seventies, as explain D.Blanchet et L.P.Pelé, measures of earlier retirement
concerned workers aged between 60 and 64. The system of resource (revenue?) maintenance
ensured 60 to 70% of the last income to any individual losing his job after having become 60
years old, up to the age of 65 which at that time had been the normal retirement age. This system
gained considerable acceptance, covering up to 425 000 people in 1983, i.e. more than 17 % of
all people aged between 60 and 64 in that year. It is in this context that retirement at the age of
60 years was introduced in 1983 with the consequence that no break in the labour force
participation rate of this age group could be observed in 1983. The introduction of retirement at
age 60 was initially expected to definitely eliminate the necessity of any form of  early
retirement. But, with the rise of the unemployment rate, it became unavoidable to reintroduce
preretirement schemes even for the age group 55-59 years.  Between 1982 and 1983, the
number of early retirées aged less than 60 years increased by 166 000 persons and reached
more than 400 000 in 1987. In 1999, there had been around 460 000 early retirées, representing
17% of people aged between 55 and 59. These massive measures of earlier retirement and the
legal age of retirement at 60 years explain clearly the very low labour force participation rate
of French people aged 55 and more.
It is important to note that the reform of 1993 of the general regime, by increasing progressively
the number of necessary contribution years from 37.5 years to 40 years, should per se have an
positive impact on the participation rate of people aged between 60 and 64 years, since few of
them are able to gather 40 years of contribution until the age of 60 years. Moreover, a
progressive decline in earlier retirement numbers, following the decrease of the unemployment
rate and a general improvement in labour market conditions, will lead to a rise of the labour
force participation rate of 55-59 years old people.
c) West Germany : a level of activity among Latin and Anglo-Saxon  countries
In West Germany, activity behaviours are close to Latin countries for oldest age groups of the
labour force (60 years and more) and quite similar to UK and USA for the 16-59 years old
population. Actually, in comparison with other industrialised countries, the labour force
participation rates of West Germans are characterised by relatively high levels for young and
for people in prime working age and low levels for oldest people.
The high level of the labour force participation of young people in Germany can be attributed to
two interrelated phenomena. The first one is the importance of the German educational system
which has a close institutional link to the labour market, that means that vocational training is
being legally tied to a job (“Duales System”), even in part-time. The other reason, which is in
part dependant  upon the first one, is the very low unemployment rate of young people in
comparison with other industrialised countries.
The rupture of participation rates between 55-59 and 60-64 years old people (–41 percentage
points for men and –37 percentage points for women in 1998) can be explained by the
introduction of a flexible retirement system since 1972, and by disability schemes.
Before that time, as is shown by A.Börsch-Supan and R.Schnabel, the system was very
inflexible and only permitted retirement at age 65, except for disability which, however, made
up for roughly 50 percent of new retirement entries. In the landmark 1972 pension reform, the
normal retirement age was still 65 years. But four derogatory dispositions permitted  the
pension payment before the age of 65 without reduction : at 63 years old after 35 years of
contribution, at 60 years old for women and unemployed people having 15 years of
contribution, at 60 years old in case of disability after 35 years of contribution.
In the 1992 social security reform,  the legal retirement age is still 65 years, but the reform
introducesa cut in pension payments for earlier retirement, except for disability pensions. The
1992 reform will only be fully effective in 2012. Nevertheless, it will be still possible to
obtain the pension payment before becoming 65 years old, but for each year of earlier
retirement benefits will be reduced by 3.6 percent per year. The 1992 reform also introduced a
reward for later retirement in a systematic way. For each year the retirement is postponed
beyond the age of 65 , the pension is increased by an additional 6 percent.
Consequently, the 1992 reform in shaping off partly the economic benefits granted by the
flexible retirement system of 1972 will per se have a progressively rising effect on the
participation rates of men and women in the age group 60-64 years. Moreover, the increase of
the pension of 6 percent for each year retirement is postponed beyond the age of 65 years old
could incite a part of oldest workers to retire after the age of 65 years and thus might increase
the participation rates of this age group.
d) United Kingdom and United States : a high activity
The labour force participation rates of these two Anglo-Saxons countries can be characterised
by two majors points : First, a high level of the overall activity, and second a rather evenly
distributed activity behaviour by age. Actually, unlike France, in the United States and in the
United Kingdom, there are no important breaks between participation rates of different
generations of the population in working-age. If we have a look on the participation rates by
generation in 1999, we observe that the form of the curve is very smoothed, participation rates
among the young and the old being very high in comparison with other countries.
In the United Kingdom and in the United States, the high level of labour force participation
among young people is closely linked to the number of persons who are at the same time in the
educational system and in employment. In this category, we can distinguish two groups : the
first one, representing the majority of this category, consists of young people studying at high
schools and universities full time and, at the same time, working part-time to earn an income to
finance their studies. The second one consists of young people who work and follow part-time
studies. For example, in the United Kingdom, it corresponds to the modernized apprenticeship
and the colleges-for-further-education system.
The comparably high participation rates of  British and American women are the result of many
factors. There are three which can broadly explain the high level of women activity. The first
one is the low unemployment rate in these two countries inciting women to work or to look for
a job. The second one is the high level of part-time employment, especially in the United
Kingdom, permitting many women to combine a job with family activities. The last one is the
high importance of employment in the service sector as compared with the rest of the economy
in the United States and the United Kingdom. Women are overrepresented in the service sector
and underrepresented in industry or agriculture (in 1998
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, USA : 73.8%; UK : 71.4%; France :
69.2%; Germany : 62.6% ; Spain : 61.7% and Italy :60.8% (figures given do relate to the
percentage of women in service sector?)).
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 These figures come from OECD Employment Outlook of June 2000
In the United Kingdom, even if participation rates of males aged 55 and more have strongly
decreased during the last three decades, they still remain higher than in other large European
countries. The important fall of the participation rate of elder workers had been in the early
eighties. In this period, as explain R.Blundell and P.Johnson, the loss of many jobs in
traditional industries where there had been a predominance of elder workers played an
important role in the initial reduction of participation rates of men aged 55 and more, since they
never recovered with the economic upturn since the latter was fed mainly by new industries at
the expense of traditional lines.
In the United Kingdom, the basis public pension system is a Beveridgian regime which pays a
lump sum. The age of retirement is 65 years for men and 60 years for women (65 years for the
latter from 2020 onwards), and the full pension is obtained after 44 years of contribution for
men and 39 years for women. The second part of the old age pension system is the State
Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS). But, in the mid-nineties, about three quarters of the
workforce were “contracted out” of the SERPS into private occupational or personal pensions.
The fall of participation rates of males aged between 55 and 64 years since the second half of
the seventies, can be explained, to a large extent, by the growth in the number of individuals
aged between 55 and 65 years who are receiving benefits initially designed for the long term
sick and disabled. Invalidity Benefit (IVB) is a contributory benefit payable to long term sick
individuals who can show they are incapable to work due to illness or disablement and who
have been so far at least 28 weeks. According to R.Disney and S.Webb, the growth in the
number of people being in receipt of IVB appears to be related directly to the growth in
unemployment rates. Given this remark and the fact thataround 23 % of males aged between 60
and 64 years were in receipt of IVB in 1999, we can suppose that IVB indeed has been used as
an early retirement vehicle.
The legal pension age for women is five years lower than that for men, but a higher proportion
of women work beyond their official pension age. According to R.Blundell and P.Johnson,
there are three major reasons for this.  One is that there is some tendency for husbands and
wives to retire at about the same time. A second is that some occupational
(employers?/private?) pension schemes have regular leaving ages for both men and women of
62 or 63. Finally, because many women reach the age of 60 years without entitlement to a full
basic pension, they have to work more years in order to raise their pension.
The activity behaviour of American elder people differs from the one in the other countries.
Actually, labour force participation rates of people aged 55 years and more are much higher
than in the large European countries, especially for women. While in all studied countries the
female participation rate for the age group 60-64 years has decreased since the beginning of the
seventies, in the United States, this rate has slightly increased, reaching 39% in 1999 (25% in
UK, 15.5% in Spain, 14.5% in France, 14% in West Germany and 8% In Italy).
For men, there has been a decrease in labour force participation rates of older  workers, but not
to the same extent as in other countries. Today, the participation rate of men aged 55 years and
more is higher than in the other large European countries.
If we have a look on the level of participation rates of persons aged  65 years and more, there is
an outstanding difference between the United States (12.3%) and the other countries studied
(5.3% in UK, 3.4% in Italy, 3% in West Germany, 1.6% in Spain and 1.3% in France).
The American pension system is characterised by a mandatory public regime, the OASDI (Old
Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance), and facultative private regimes. In the public regime,
the normal age of retirement is 65 years. But it is possible to obtain the pension payment from
62 years onwards, with a reduction of 6.66% per year. A departure after the normal age
increase the pension amount by 5.5% per year. An American worker must contribute to the
public insurance system at least 10 years to obtain a pension.
In 1983, a reform has taken place which introduced an increase of the normal retirement age
from 65 to 67 years, for all people reaching the age of 62 years between 2000 and 2022.
Moreover, the normal retirement age will rise from 65 to 66 years between 2000 and 2005, and
from 66 to 67 years between 2017 and 2022. It shall still be possible to obtain the pension
payment at the age 62, but the reduction of the pension will again be 6.66% per year for less
than 3 years of anticipation of the legal retirement age and 5% per year for more than 3 years of
anticipation. In addition, the incentive to obtain the pension payment after the age of 67 years
will be made stronger : from 5.5% per year, the increase in the pension will be raised to 8%
per year for the generation born in 1943. (?) (generations born after/until 1943??)
To sum up, the high labour force participation rates of elder persons in the US, which can be
explained partly by only very limited possibilities to leave the labour force before the age of 65
years and obtain a full pension, should continue to increase in the future with the rise of the
normal retirement age during the next twenty years.
 5.  The Labour Force Projections
We have derived labour force projections from the estimations of participation rates by sex and
age groups. The participation rates we obtained are in accordance with the definition of the
International Labour Office. Thus, Employment and Unemployment correspond to very precise
objective criteria. In order to obtain projections of the labour force by sex and age, we apply
the estimated participation rates to the demographic projections.
5.1 The Demographic Projections
For France, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom, we retained three demographic scenarios
elaborated by Eurostat and one scenario prepared by a national institute of each country. For
United States and Germany, we utilised respectively three demographic scenarios of the United
States Census Bureau and three demographic scenarios of the Statistisches Bundesamt which
distinguish between West and East Germany.
These projections follow different assumptions concerning the future evolution of the three
factors which condition demographic changes : fertility, mortality (or life expectancy) and
international migrations.
The Eurostat high scenario can be interpreted as the most optimistic version of future
population growth (high fertility rate, high life expectancy at birth , high net immigration).
Accordingly, this scenario will result in the highest estimated level of the labour force.
At the opposite, the low scenario is the pessimistic version with, for example, low net
immigration, declining (France), stagnating (United Kingdom) or only marginally increasing
(Italy, Spain) birth rates and a rather weak rise in average life expectancy. Hence under these
conditions we will get more or less depressed estimates of the future labour force..
The most probable demographic scenarios seem to us the Eurostat baseline scenario and the
national scenarios, which have in common very moderate demographic assumptions. These two
scenarios are rather similar in the assumption for the fertility rate and for life expectancy.
However, there is a difference in the assumptions for net immigration, except for France. For
United Kingdom, Italy and Spain, assumptions of net immigration are higher in the Eurostat
baseline scenario than in the national scenario.
Table 7: Demographic Assumptions for the Population Projections of Eurostat and the National Institute of each Country
France United Kingdom
Assumptions Scenarios 1999 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 1999 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020





79.4 79.8 74.9 70.0 70.0 70.0 75.5 73.0 69.0 70.0 70.0 70.0
Eurostat baseline
scenario
50.2 50.1 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 44.4 38.3 37.9 45.0 45.0 45.0
National scenario 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 40.0 15.0 0.0





1.93 1.97 2.06 2.09 2.09 2.10 1.91 1.94 2.04 2.08 2.09 2.10
Eurostat baseline
scenario
1.72 1.73 1.78 1.79 1.79 1.80 1.72 1.72 1.73 1.75 1.77 1.79
National scenario ... 1.79 1.80 1.80 1.80 1.80 1.75 1.76 1.79 1.80 1.80 1.80





75.4 75.6 77.0 78.2 79.3 80.3 75.7 76.0 77.2 78.4 79.5 80.4
males Eurostat baseline
scenario
74.7 74.8 75.8 76.8 77.6 78.3 75.0 75.2 76.1 77.0 77.7 78.3
National scenario ... 74.6 75.5 76.4 77.2 78.0 75.0 75.1 76.0 76.6 77.2 77.6





83.1 83.2 84.3 85.2 86.0 86.6 80.8 81.0 82.0 82.9 83.8 84.6
females Eurostat baseline
scenario
82.7 82.8 83.6 84.2 84.9 85.4 80.2 80.3 81.1 81.9 82.6 83.2
National scenario ... 83.0 83.9 84.6 85.7 86.5 80.0 80.1 80.8 81.5 82.1 82.6
Italy Spain
Assumptions Scenarios 1999 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 1999 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020





80.0 80.0 90.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 55.0 57.2 72.4 80.0 80.0 80.0
Eurostat baseline
scenario
50.0 50.0 65.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 30.3 31.1 45.5 60.0 60.0 60.0
National Scenario 49.9 50.0 50.9 52.4 54.3 56.1 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0





1.53 1.58 1.72 1.77 1.79 1.80 1.55 1.59 1.72 1.77 1.79 1.80
Eurostat baseline
scenario
1.35 1.37 1.45 1.48 1.49 1.50 1.34 1.36 1.43 1.47 1.48 1.50
National scenario 1.29 1.31 1.43 1.46 1.46 1.45 1.24 1.25 1.32 1.43 1.56 1.70





75.8 75.9 77.2 78.4 79.4 80.4 75.2 75.3 76.7 77.9 78.9 79.8
males Eurostat baseline
scenario
75.1 75.1 76.1 76.9 77.7 78.3 74.4 74.4 75.0 75.5 76.1 76.7
National scenario 75.7 75.9 76.6 77.1 77.7 78.3 74.0 74.1 74.8 75.3 75.7 76.0





82.1 82.2 83.1 84.0 84.8 85.4 82.2 82.3 83.2 84.1 84.8 85.4
females Eurostat baseline
scenario
81.7 81.7 82.4 83.0 83.6 84.0 81.7 81.8 82.5 83.1 83.6 84.0
National scenario 82.2 82.3 83.0 83.5 84.1 84.7 81.7 81.9 82.5 83.0 83.4 83.7
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The immigrant population is very important in United States. Thus the US Census Bureau take
into account, for its projection of resident population, the differences of demographic behaviour
among White, Black, American Indian and Asian people and distinguishes, for each category of
these sub-populations, between Hispanic and other origins. Thus, the US Census Bureau makes
assumptions for net immigration, fertility rates and life expectancy relating to eight groups of the
resident population. We have the demographic assumptions for 1999 and for 2025 only. During
the period between these two years, the demographic key figures mentioned above are assumed
to follow a (linear?) trend.
Table 8: Demographic Assumptions for the Population Projections of the US Census Bureau
A s s u m p t i o n s S c e n a r i o s 1 9 9 9 2 0 2 5
L o w e s t 7 3 9 1 8 3
H i g h e s t 1 1 9 1 2 2 6 8
Midd le 9 5 4 9 1 2
L o w e s t 2,035.8 1,865.5
H i g h e s t 2,059.2 2,557.5
Midd le 2,047.5 2,206.8
L o w e s t 74.0 76.5
H i g h e s t 74.1 79.1
Midd le 74.1 77.6
L o w e s t 79.7 82.6
H i g h e s t 79.8 84.6
Midd le 79.8 83.6
Yea r l y  Ne t
Migra t ions
(1000 )
Total  Fert i l i ty
Rate
Li fe
E x p e c t a n c y  a t
B i r th  -  ma les
Li fe
E x p e c t a n c y  a t
Bir th -
f ema les
Demographic projections of the Statistisches Bundesamt are separating between West and East
Germany. Assumptions relating to  yearly net immigration are for total Germany. Concerningthe
total fertility rate, demographers suppose a stagnation from 1999 to 2020 in the three scenarios
for West Germany. For East Germany the most likely assumption is an progressive increase
until the same value as in West Germany is reached.
The only difference between the baseline and the high scenario relates to life expectancy.
Actually, in the high scenario, authors consider that life expectancy at birth in 2050 will
increase by two years more than in the baseline scenario.
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Table 9: Demographic Assumptions for Population Projections in Germany
Assumptions Scenarios 1999 2003 2005 2009 2010-2019 2020-2029
Low
scenario






90 150 190 240 230 215
Baseline
scenario
90 150 190 240 230 215
Low
scenario





1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
Baseline
scenario
1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
Table 10: Demographic Assumptions for Population Projections in Germany
1998 2025




























The three population projection scenarios show demographic assumptions within a rather
narrow range. The only difference between the baseline and the low scenario concerns the level
of yearly net immigration. The change in demographic projections between the baseline and the
high scenario focuses at the life expectancy at birth.
As to the future population development in these four countries, we can distinguish two groups.
The first one consists of France and the United Kingdom. In these two countries the overall
population growth will be checked in a rather abrupt manner beyond the year 2010 (see chart).
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In the United Kingdom this reversal would  be significantly less pronounced than in France.
Indeed, except in the case of the high scenario of Eurostat, the positive growth rate of the
working age population would suddenly become negative beyond 2010. This break in 2010
corresponds to the date where the outflow from the labour force, namely the first generation of
the baby-boom, born in 1945, reaches the age of 65 years. Contrary to this, the inflow into the
labour force will be determined by the generations of  the second half of the nineties, a period
of very low fertility, who will then reach working age. Beyond 2010, the annual decrease in the
number of 15-64 years old people is more or less constant.
Figure 9: Projections of 15-64 years old Population According to Different
Assumptions


































































































































































































































The second group consists of Spain and Italy. For these two countries, there is no obvious
demographic break between 1998 and 2020. The most essential result for these two countries is
that the fall of the population in working age accelerates with years. In the case of Italy, the
demographic outlook will become in any case particularly worrying: the shrinking of the
working age population is very pronounced. This decline can be explained, on the one hand, by
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the pronatalistic policy during the Mussolini era, and, on the other hand, by the steep fall of the
fertility rate in the second half of seventies.
Figure 10 : Projections of 15-64 years old Population According to Different Assumptions





































































































In Spain, the marked decline in birth rates has been less pronounced and considerably later than
in Italy.  A special feature is that Spain experienced already a phase of low birth rates during
the period of its civil war in the thirties. It explains that the population in working age will
remain almost constant up to 2010 and then shall decrease more and more fast beyond this date.
The evolution of the population in working age in West Germany for the next twenty years
differs in many respects from the one in the United Kingdom and in the Latin countries. We can
distinguish three periods. From 1998 to 2007, the number of persons aged 15-64 years is
expected to decrease since the very numerous individuals born between 1933 and 1941 (strong
pronatalistic policy during the “Third Reich”) will reach retirement age (65 years). From 2007
to 2012, the assumed high net yearly immigrations and the comparably low outflow from the
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working age population due to the fact that the smaller generations born between 1942 and 1947
will leave the work force should have a positive impact on the evolution of the demographic
component of labour supply. Starting 2013, the decrease of the work force will accelerate since
the bay-boom generation 1948-1968 is reaching gradually the age of inactivity.
In Eastern Germany, the decline of the working age population would be much more
pronounced in the next twenty years than in Western Germany. Among others, the world-wide
unique decline in Eastern German birth rates after reunification which has been checked since
1995, but has since then risen only gradually, as well as the lasting net emigration to western
Germany, are the main reasons for this.
In the United States, the ageing of the population is much less pronounced than in European
countries. Accordingly, if we do not take into account the high scenario of Eurostat which
seems to be particularly optimistic, all the large European countries would experience a
marked decrease in their working age population during the two coming decades. In the United
States, the only marginal ageing of the population would have to be translated into a very
moderate slowing down of the growth rate of the working age population.  This marginal ageing
of the American population is largely due to the influence of immigration into the United States.
The immigrant populations as a rule show a much better age structure (preponderance of young
adults and children), and they will have, at least after some years of stay in the US, a higher
birth rate than the domestic population. In 1965, the law on immigration has been revised and
the system of quotas by nationality instituting a preference in favour of Anglo-Saxon countries
has been abolished, thereby boosting immigration.  From 1965 until now, the number of legal
immigrants has gradually risen from 300 000 to approximately 1 million per year, these
immigrants being by more than 80% of Asiatic or Hispanic origin. This has to be amended by a
fast growing number of illegal immigrants mainly from Mexico. According to the assumptions
of the baseline scenario, the net yearly immigration should vary between 910 000 persons and
950 000 persons from 1999 to 2025 which seems to be a rather conservative hypothesis. Thus,
an important part of the growth of the population in working age is due to immigration.
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5.2.2  Participation Rate Estimations
In order to obtain labour force projections for the six countries, we have estimated econometric
equations determining participation rates by sex and age groups. The activity behaviour differs
between countries, but they are also differences between age groups and sex in the same
country. So we choose six age groups (15-19, 20-24, 25-54, 55-59, 60-64, 65+). Thus, we have
twelve estimations for each country.  (c.f. annex)
The estimated participation rates are decomposed into a more technical term, namely a logistic
trend (with upper and lower limits), and into a compound economic term including the
unemployment rate, the early retirement rate and the share of part-time in total employment.
PRij = (1+a1*UR+a6*ERR+a7*PTE)*(a2+a3*exp(a4+a5*time))/(1+exp(a4+a5*time))
where PR is the participation rate , i = age group ={1,...,6} and j = sex ={1,2},UR the
unemployment rate, ERR the early retirement rate (= part of early retirees in age group), PTE
the percentage of part time in total employment, a2 is the estimated lower limit of the
participation rate,a3 is the estimated upper limit of the participation rate, a5 represents the
estimated speed of diffusion of activity behaviour, a4 is an initial condition, but the estimate for
(-a4/a5) coincidates with the year of inflexion in the evolution of participation rate.
Factors influencing the participation rates according to age and sex are very numerous as well
as rather heterogenous (cultural, demographic or socio-economic). The logistic trend is
therefore supposed to catch all phenomena that have an important impact on the development of
participation rates, over and above the included variables unemployment rate,  early retirement
measures and part time work. Moreover, for forecasting purposes, a logistic trend, by capturing
the effects of a large number of variables not included in the econometric analysis, allows to
limit the number of assumptions considerably.
The coefficient a6 has to capture the impact of earlier retirement measures on participation
rates of the elder work force.  Since the number of  early retirées is not available for all
countries, we could take it into account explicitely for France and West Germany only.
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The coefficient a7 shows the contribution of the share of part time in total employment to the
explanation of female participation rates,not withstanding the fact that both variables are
heavily interrelated, i.e. are generated by the same labour market sub-system.
The coefficient a1 is thought to measure the responsiveness of the participation rate to the
unemployment rate. Some persons (especially young and elder members of the work force or
married women) adjust their  activity behaviour according to the situation on the labour market,
represented by the variable unemployment rate. The prospective return to full employment in
the European economy should therefore, via the responsiveness of the participation rate to the
unemployment rate, increase future labour supply. Indeed, inactive persons who are sensitive to
the improvement in the situation on the labour market, are going to look for a full or part-time
job. This contributes to the enlargement of the labour force and thus, per se, delays the return to
full employment. Hence, the value of the coefficient a1 should measure the fluctuation effect (?
cyclical impact?) on the activity level.
For series with a break in the trend or an "accident" of data (?), we have introduced an
indicator variable. This variable had been either constructed as an additive to the first term
containing UR, ERR and PTE or, alternatively, included into the logistic trend.
5.3.3 Results of labour force projections
The labour force projections up to  2020 are obtained as follows : for each age and sex group,
the projected participation rates are applied to the demographic projections.

































Where TLF is the total labour force, LFij is the labour force by age group and sex, PRij is the
participation rate by age group and sex, and POPij  is the population by age group and sex.
60
For each country, there are several (three or four) demographic scenarios. They give
boundaries for the labour force evolutions, the upper limit being the high scenario, the lower
limit being the low scenario.
France
Following the baseline scenario of Eurostat, four periods may be distinguished in the future
development of the French work force.
Figure 11













































































From 1998 to 2005, the rate of increase of labour supply will remain high. All factors will have
a positive impact on the work force. The demographic component alone will allow the active
labour force to increase by 830 000 persons. Moreover, the assumed/forecast (?) decrease of
the unemployment rate will give an incentive to more and more people entering the labour
market. This effect will be concentrated on younger and elder persons, two groups whose
labour participation responsiveness to the unemployment rate is high. The cumulative effect is
estimated to amount to 250 000 persons. Two other factors will allow the labour force to
increase even further. The first is the positive trend element in participation rates, essentially
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the expected further rise in the participation rate of adult women.  The second is the increase in
the participation rate of persons in the age group 55-59 years under the assumption, that the
early retirement and the job search (?) exemption schemes will be cut off in view of the lower
unemployment rate. The total effect of both factors will amount to another 310 000 persons
between 1998 and 2005.
The second period covers the years 2005 to 2010. This period is characterised by a marked
slow down in the rate of increase of the labour force. Only the upward trend of the participation
rate will continue to make a persistent contribution to the increase in labour supply. The
positive reaction of labour force to unemployment will be of less importance. Under the
assumptions of our model, the equilibrium unemployment rate of 5% will be reached in 2007.
Thus the reaction to unemployment will play a role only in the first two years of the period. The
positive effect from demographics will vanish, since the already more numerous first post-war
generations will enter the 55-59 age group, where the participation rates are low.
From 2010 on, the decrease of the labour force will begin, as the baby-boom generations will
become older and will progressively leave the labour force. Only the upward trend of the
participation rate should continue to have a positive effect on the number of active persons. To
a great amount, this increase is induced by the assumption of a progressive suppression of early
retirement schemes up to 2015. The upward trend of the participation rate of women in the age
group 25-54 years  will not continue beyond 2010.
From 2015 on, the decrease of the labour force accelerates, due to the demographic shrinking
process. The first baby-boom cohorts will begin to reach age groups with usually very low
participation rates. Following the baseline demographic scenario, the decrease of the labour
force between 2015 and 2020 could amount to 430 000 persons.
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Table 11: France :Variation of the labour force in the baseline scenario and contribution of
different effects
(t-1) - t 1998-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 2015-2020
Variation of the 
labour force 
between t and t-1
1398074 323375 -126828 -433521
Trend evolution of 
participation rates
313133 171969 133813 -891
Effect of the 
responsiveness of 
the participation 
rate to the 
unemployment 
rate
253721 72987 0 0
Demographic 
effect
831221 78419 -260641 -432630
West Germany
The future development of the West German labour force will exhibit specific pecularities
when compared with all the other large EU-countries (see Graph ...). The difference between
the low and the baseline scenario is caused exclusively by the assumption of a much higher net
yearly immigration in the latter scenario. Moreover it is postulated that new immigrants will
react as the existing labour force. – Three periods can be identified.
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Figure 12












































































Following the baseline scenario, the labour force shows a net decrease of 390 000 persons
between 1998 and 2002. This decrease would be much higher taking into account demographic
factors only (590 000 persons). The resulting progressive decline in the unemployment rate will
encourage an additional 210 000 persons to enter the labour market, mainly women and men of
the age group 20-24 years. This age group is very sensitive to the unemployment rate for two
reasons : with a lower unemployment rate, scholars and students make use of the possibility to
combine a study with a job ; at the same time, a smaller unemployment rate lowers also the
incentive to prolonged studies.
The second period covers the years 2002 to 2012. It is characterised by an renewed increase of
approximately 277 000 persons in labour supply. Since the demographic effect is neutral, this is
mainly due to the assumptions related to net immigration (a progressive increase up to the year
2010 to make up for the decline in the domestic population in working age). From 2002 to
2012, the rise in the labour force is caused by the upward trend of the participation rates
(+141 000 persons) and by activating additional persons who had not been in the work force
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before via the improved labour market conditions, e.g. the decrease of unemployment rate
(+137 000 persons). The upward trend concerns mainly persons in the age group 60-64 years. It
is caused by a cut back of the pre-retirement schemes and by the increase of the participation
rate of women in the age group 55-59 years. The reaction of the labour force to unemployment
will have a positive impact in the years 2002 to 2004. It ends in 2004 when the unemployment
rate reaches its equilibrium rate.
From 2012 on, the level of the labour force will fall again. This decrease will be more and
more rapid. Following the baseline scenario, the number of active persons should decline by
more than one million between 2012 and 2020. This is mainly due to the fact that the baby-
boom generation  will enter the age group with low participation rates.
Table 12: West Germany :Variation of the labour force in the baseline scenario and
contribution of different effects
(t-1) - t 1998-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 2015-2020
Variation of the 
labour force 
between t and t-1
-331705 183476 -145278 -899059
Trend evolution of 
participation rates
13691 74196 73952 43626
Effect of the 
responsiveness of 
the participation 
rate to the 
unemployment 
rate
351746 0 0 0
Demographic 
effect
-697142 109280 -219229 -942685
Italy
The future development of Italian labour supply can be decomposed into two periods. The first
covers the years 1998 to 2005 and is characterised by an increase of the labour force.
According to the baseline scenario, the rise of the labour force should amount to 412 000
persons. Since the demographic contribution is negative (approximately 280 000 persons), the
increase is exclusively due to higher participation rates. The upward trend of the latter will
allow a growth of 436 000 persons in the labour force. This is mainly caused by higher
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participation rates of Italian women in the age groups 25-49 and 50-59 years, thus leading to a
convergence of the labour participation rate of women among Europe.
Figure 13



















































































The responsiveness of the work force to the declining unemployment rate explains an additional
increase of 256 000 persons in labour supply. This concerns mainly people older than 50 years.
It is important to notice that the participation rate of Italian women in the age groups 15-19 and
20-24 reacts negatively to a decrease in the unemployment rate (additional worker effect).
From 2005 on, the contraction of the labour force will accelerate. Between 2005 and 2020, the
total decrease would amount to 1 860 000 persons in the baseline scenario. This fall is caused
by the progressive ageing of the Italian population, which is due to the fact that the baby-boom
generation will leave the labour force as well as by the fact that the much smaller cohorts born
in the years from about 1990 until about 2005 can only partly replace them.
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Table 13: Italy :Variation of the labour force in the baseline scenario and contribution of
different effects
(t-1) - t 1998-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 2015-2020
Variation of the 
labour force 
between t and t-1
411826 -464610 -668858 -728291
Trend evolution of 
participation rates 435919 17932 17882 17624
Effect of the 
responsiveness of 
the participation 
rate to the 
unemployment 
rate
255844 57627 0 0
Demographic 
effect
-279936 -540169 -686740 -745915
Spain
The future development of the labour force in Spain is quite similar to the one in France up to
2010. During the years 1998-2005, all factors will contribute to a further growth in labour
supply. The demographic component should allow for an increase of nearly half a million
persons. Moreover, as in Italy, the catch-up of the participation rate of women in the age groups
25-54 and 55-years to the one of man will contribute positively to the evolution of the labour
force.
In Spain, the labour force responsiveness to unemployment is lower than in the other countries.
This can on a vice versa-basis be derived from the estimate that in the past 100 new jobs
lowered the number of unemployed by 87 as compared with 82 in France, 80 in Italy, 79 in
West-Germany, 75 in the UK and  67 in the USA. The main reason behind this is the fact that the
unemployment rate was very high in Spain in the mid nineties ( 23.7 % in 1994). So, the
positive impact of the labour market situation on the labour force will be longer lasting in Spain
( +181 000 persons between 1998 and 2005 , +104 000 between 2005 and 2010) than in the
other countries mentioned above.
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Figure 14





































































From 2005 to 2010, the rate of increase of the labour force will come down. The decrease of
the unemployment rate will be the sole factor pushing upwards further the labour supply.
Beyond 2010, the labour force will start to decrease. The fall should be quite similar to the
development observed in Italy, but with a delay of ten years. Actually, disregarding the
temporal gap, the age structure in Spain is very similar to the former Italian one and the
demographic assumptions of both scenarios are also very similar. Hence, from 2010 onwards,
the balance between new entrants and outgoing will be negative and the labour force will
decrease.
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Table 14: Spain :Variation of the labour force in the baseline scenario and contribution of
different effects
(t-1) - t 1998-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 2015-2020
Variation of the 
labour force 
between t and t-1
842417 48968 -302789 -406664
Trend evolution of 
participation rates 162448 2509 -3994 -3075
Effect of the 
responsiveness of 
the participation rate 
to the 
unemployment rate
180854 104265 0 0
Demographic effect 499116 -57805 -298796 -403589
United Kingdom
Following the baseline scenario, the future labour force development can be divided into three
periods:
The first one covers the years 1998 to 2010. It is characterised by an increasing labour force. In
1999, an apparently cyclical upsurge of the participation rate, following a slight downturn in
1998, has caused an important rise of the labour force. During the whole period 1998 and 2010,
the labour force should increase by more than 940 000 persons. About three quarters of this is













































































Moreover, the latter positive effect is concentrated in the years 1998 up to 2005. Despite a
quite low unemployment rate at the beginning of the period, the high responsiveness of the
labour force participation to the unemployment rate allows the labour force to increase by
another more than 108 000 persons between 1998 and 2004, the year in which full employment
is reached. The upward trend of the participation rate contributes more than 100 000 persons to
the rise in the labour force during the period 1998 up to 2005. This is mainly due to the increase
of the participation rate of men in the age group 60-64 and of women in the age group 25 - 64
years.
The second period is characterised by a slight decrease of the labour force (–53 000 from 2010
to 2015). Again the reason for this has to be searched in the demographic  sector. Nevertheless
this phenomenon is  less accentuated in the UK mainly because the baby-boom here had been
less pronounced and, moreover, because the birth rate during the last two decades was
substantially higher in the UK than in many other European countries.
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Table 15: United Kingdom :Variation of the labour force in the baseline scenario and
contribution of different effects.
(t-1) - t 1998-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 2015-2020
Variation of the 
labour force 
between t and t-1
712513 228592 -52975 -349004
Trend  evolution of 
participation rates
100781 13225 18542 2809
Effect of the 
responsiveness of 
the participation 
rate to the 
unemployment rate
108874 0 0 0
Demographic effect 502858 215367 -71517 -351813
From 2015 to 2020, the accelerating ageing combined with a decline of the UK population will
cause a decrease of nearly 350 000 in the labour force.
United States
The outlook for the American labour force differs very substantially from the one in Europe.
Whereas all European countries will be confronted with a contraction of the labour force up to
2020, the main change in the USA will be only a decrease of the growth rate of labour supply.
Labour force participation rates are already very high in the USA. It therefore would not be
appropriate to make the assumption of a significant rise up to 2020. Moreover, the
unemployment rate can already be considered to have reached its equilibrium level, and
accordingly the responsiveness of the labour force to unemployment is negligible. The increase
of the labour force is therefore only caused by demographic factors.
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Figure 16






















































































Following the baseline scenario, the future demographic development will remain very
dynamic. The net yearly immigration amounts to nearly one million persons. Most of the new
migrants are in prime working age and will join the American labour force under the
assumption that these immigrants have the same activity behaviour as the American resident
population. Moreover, the migrants, mostly of Hispanic and Asiatic origin, should have more
children than the average with the consequence that the fertility indicator in the USA is much
higher than in the other industrialised countries since the beginning of the nineties. This in turn
will largely outweigh the negative impact of the outgoing US baby-boom generation on the
projected labour force.
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Table 16: United States :Variation of the labour force in the baseline scenario and contribution
of different effects.
(t-1) - t 1998-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 2015-2020
Variation of the 
labour force 
between t and t-1
9916569 5503231 3251398 1900922
Trend  evolution of 
participation rates 47111 17364 11051 6566
Effect of the 
responsiveness of 
the participation 
rate to the 
unemployment rate
0 0 0 0
Demographic effect 9869457 5485867 3240347 1894356
5. Conclusions
The prospect for labour supply in Europe are considered. The analyses begins with a so-called
labour market balance covering the development on an aggregate level. Estimations to shed
light on the relation between unemployment and labour force participation are given in the
second part of the paper. A detailed analyses of the forces behind the participation rates for
individual countries and labour force projections are given. We expect the labour force in
Europe to decline during the next years. However, the impact on unemployment of this
development is rather limited.
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Appendix Table 1 – Labour Market Balance for EU-15
Part 1 — Population and Population Changes (1,000 persons if not otherwise stated)
Total population Natural population changes Immi-
live births deaths excess of gration




























1985 358,475 674 4,275 11.93 3,765 10.50 510 164
1986 359,149 837 4,288 11.94 3,735 10.40 553 284
1987 359,986 827 4,293 11.93 3,655 10.15 638 189
1988 360,813 1,317 4,358 12.08 3,676 10.19 682 635
1989 362,130 1,633 4,309 11.90 3,692 10.20 617 1,016
1990 363,763 1,672 4,379 12.04 3,721 10.23 658 1,009
1991 365,435 1,638 4,290 11.74 3,730 10.21 560 1,078
1992 367,073 1,921 4,248 11.57 3,676 10.01 572 1,350
1993 368,994 1,439 4,140 11.22 3,759 10.19 381 1,058
1994 370,433 1,157 4,053 10.94 3,679 9.93 374 783
1995 371,590 1,080 4,009a 10.79a 3,734 10.05a 275a 805
1996 372,670 1,047 4,040a 10.84a 3,732 10.01a 308a 739
1997 373,717 867 4,047a 10.83a 3,685 9.86a 362a 505
1998 374,584 874 4,018a 10.73a 3,723 9.94a 295a 578
1999 375,458 989 4,005 10.67 3,727 9.93 278 711
2000 376,455 1,159 4,055 10.77 3,712 9.86 343 816
2001a 377,614 1,008 4,022 10.65 3,738 9.90 283 725
Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç
2005* 381,235 956c 3,983c 10.52c 3,740c 9.88c 243c 713c
Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç
2010* 385,271 807c 3,787c 9.89c 3,772c 9.85c 42c 765c
Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç
2015* 388,289 604c 3,633c 9.40c 3,809c 9.86c –176c 780c
Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç
2020* 391,028 548c 3,551c 9.12c 3,867c 9.93c –316c 864c
*Forecast based on assumptions about crude birth and death rates as well as net immigration. –
aPreliminary. – bIncluding revisions due to the results of population censuses, errors and omissions. –
cYearly average during preceding five-year-period.
Source: EUROSTAT-Jahrbuch, Europa im Blick der Statistik, Ausgaben 2.1995/96, 3.1996/97, 4.1998/99,
5.2000. – EUROSTAT, Bevölkerungsstatistik 1960/99. – EUROSTAT, Europäische Sozialstatistik -
Bevölkerung, Ausgabe 2000. – EUROSTAT, Erhebung über Arbeitskräfte - Ergebnisse 1995–1999.
– EUROSTAT, Statistik kurzgefaßt, Bevölkerung und soziale Bedingungen, Thema 3 - 16/2000:
Erste Bevölkerungsschätzungen für 2000. – OECD, Quarterly Labour Force Statistics. – Statisti-
sches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Ausland, various issues. – Own estimates, in-
terpolations and forecasts.
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Part 2 — Age Structure of the Population (1,000 persons if not otherwise stated)








































1985 70,620 19.70 239,102 66.70 48,753 13.60
1986 69,425 –1,195 19.33a 240,233 1,131 66.89a 49,491 738 13.78a
1987 68,414 –1,011 19.00a 241,318 1,085 67.04a 50,254 763 13.96a
1988 67,401 –1,013 18.68a 242,393 1,075 67.18a 51,019 765 14.14a
1989 66,830 –571 18.45a 243,443 1,050 67.23a 51,857 838 14.32a
1990 66,569 –261 18.30 244,448 1,005 67.20 52,746 889 14.50
1991 66,399 –170 18.17a 245,427 979 67.16a 53,609 863 14.67a
1992 66,182 –217 18.03a 246,455 1,028 67.14a 54,436 827 14.83a
1993 66,049 –133 17.90 247,596 1,141 67.10 55,349 913 15.00
1994 65,937 –112 17.80 248,190 594 67.00 56,306 957 15.20
1995 65,400 –537 17.60 248,965 775 67.00 57,225 919 15.40
1996 64,845 –555 17.40 249,688 723 67.00 58,137 912 15.60
1997 64,653 –192 17.30 250,390 702 67.00 58,674 537 15.70
1998 64,054 –599 17.10 250,971 581 67.00 59,559 885 15.90
1999 63,813 –241 17.00 251,382 411 66.95 60,263 704 16.05
2000 63,771 –42 16.94 251,773 391 66.88 60,910 647 16.18
Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç
2005 62,408 –273b 16.37 253,941 434b 66.61 64,886 795b 17.02
Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç
2010 61,104 –261b 15.86 255,974 407b 66.44 68,193 661b 17.70
Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç
2015 59,797 –262b 15.40 256,465 99b 66.05 72,028 767b 18.55
Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç
2020 59,162 –127b 15.13* 254,598 –373b 65.11* 77,267 1,048b 19.76*
*Own forecast using as a guide-line the most actual national forecasts compiled by EUROSTAT for
EU-15. These are much more detailed, starting, for example, with assumptions about net reproduction
rates or about average life expectancy for different age groups. – aOwn interpolations. – bYearly
average during preceding five-year-period.
Source: EUROSTAT-Jahrbuch, Europa im Blick der Statistik, Ausgaben 2.1995/96, 3.1996/97, 4.1998/99,
5.2000. – EUROSTAT, Bevölkerungsstatistik 1960/99. – EUROSTAT, Europäische Sozialstatistik -
Bevölkerung, Ausgabe 2000. – EUROSTAT, Erhebung über Arbeitskräfte - Ergebnisse 1995–1999.
– EUROSTAT, Statistik kurzgefaßt, Bevölkerung und soziale Bedingungen, Thema 3 - 16/2000:
Erste Bevölkerungsschätzungen für 2000. – OECD, Quarterly Labour Force Statistics. – Statisti-
sches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Ausland, various issues. – Own estimates, in-
terpolations and forecasts.
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Part 3 — Impact of the Educational System on the Workforce (in 1,000 persons if not
otherwise stated)
Scholars at secondary stage II
(15 years+)a
Students at universities and high
schoolsb
Persons in working




























1985 17,193d 7.19 7,543e 3.15 214,366
1986 17,350d 157 7.22 7,677e 134 3.20 215,206 840
1987 17,612 262 7.30 7,841 164 3.25 215,865 659
1988 17,797 185 7.34 8,076 235 3.33 216,520 655
1989 17,972 175 7.38 8,415 339 3.46 217,056 536
1990 17,988 16 7.36 8,816 401 3.61 217,644 588
1991 18,292 304 7.45 9,614 798 3.92 217,521 –123
1992 18,771 479 7.62 10,114 500 4.10 217,570 49
1993 19,114 343 7.72 10,845 731 4.38 217,637 67
1994 19,506 392 7.86 11,528 683 4.64 217,156 –481
1995 19,327 –179 7.76 11,790 262 4.74 217,848 692
1996 19,694 367 7.89 11,931 141 4.78 218,063 215
1997 19,369 –325 7.74 12,266 335 4.90 218,755 692
1998 19,701 332 7.85 12,549 283 5.00 218,721 –34
1999 19,884 183 7.91 12,820 272 5.10 218,677 –44
2000 20,016 132 7.95 13,092 272 5.20 218,665 –12
Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç
2005 20,315 60f 8.00 14,424 266f 5.68 219,202 107f
Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç
2010 20,516 40f 8.02 15,128 141f 5.91 220,330 226f
Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç
2015 20,594 16f 8.03 15,311 37f 5.97 220,560 46f
Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç
2020 20,495 –20f 8.05 15,301 –2f 6.01 218,802 352f
aISCED3; definition in accordance with the "International Standard Classification for Education
[ISCED] of the UNESCO 1976; these scholars are normally 14 or 15 years old when they enter
ISCED3. – bISCED5-7. – cSchooling year 1984/85, etc. – dOwn estimates based upon ISCED1-2 and
ISCED1-3 and 5-7. – eOwn estimates (trend extrapolation backwards). – fYearly average during
preceding five-year-period.
Source: EUROSTAT-Jahrbuch, Europa im Blick der Statistik, Ausgaben 2.1995/96, 3.1996/97, 4.1998/99,
5.2000. – EUROSTAT, Bevölkerungsstatistik 1960/99. – EUROSTAT, Europäische Sozialstatistik -
Bevölkerung, Ausgabe 2000. – EUROSTAT, Erhebung über Arbeitskräfte - Ergebnisse 1995–1999.
– EUROSTAT, Statistik kurzgefaßt, Bevölkerung und soziale Bedingungen, Thema 3 - 16/2000:
Erste Bevölkerungsschätzungen für 2000. – OECD, Quarterly Labour Force Statistics. – Statisti-
sches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Ausland, various issues. – Own estimates, in-
terpolations and forecasts.
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Part 4 — Smoothed Series of Persons in Working Age (excl. scholars and students) (in 1,000
persons)

























aYearly average during preceding five-year-period.
Source: EUROSTAT-Jahrbuch, Europa im Blick der Statistik, Ausgaben 2.1995/96, 3.1996/97, 4.1998/99,
5.2000. – EUROSTAT, Bevölkerungsstatistik 1960/99. – EUROSTAT, Europäische Sozialstatistik -
Bevölkerung, Ausgabe 2000. – EUROSTAT, Erhebung über Arbeitskräfte - Ergebnisse 1995–1999.
– EUROSTAT, Statistik kurzgefaßt, Bevölkerung und soziale Bedingungen, Thema 3 - 16/2000:
Erste Bevölkerungsschätzungen für 2000. – OECD, Quarterly Labour Force Statistics. – Statisti-
sches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Ausland, various issues. – Own estimates, in-
terpolations and forecasts.
Part 5 — Actual Labour Force and Visible Participation Rate (in 1,000 persons unless otherwise stated)
Total employment Unemployment according to
ILO/EU Labour Force Sample
Concept
Actual labour force Visible Participation Rate: Actual
labour force as % of persons in
working age
Visible Participation Rate:
Year absolute number change from
previous year
absolute number change from
previous year
absolute number change from
previous year







1985 140,940 15,884 156,824 73.26 73.22 –0.04
1986 140,350 –590 16,155 271 156,505 –319 72.93 –0.33 73.63 0.70
1987 143,156 2,806 15,776 –379 158,932 2,427 73.87 0.94 74.04 0.17
1988 146,539 3,383 14,870 –906 161,409 2,477 74.77 0.90 74.45 –0.32
1989 148,699 2,160 13,511 –1,359 162,210 801 74.93 0.16 74.84 –0.09
1990 152,015 3,316 12,700 –811 164,715 2,505 75.88 0.95 75.21 –0.67
1991 152,235 220 13,418 718 165,653 938 76.19 0.31 75.55 –0.64
1992 150,170 –2,065 15,332 1,914 165,502 –151 76.07 –0.13 75.88 –0.19
1993 147,731 –2,439 17,744 2,412 165,475 –27 76.05 –0.01 76.19 0.14
1994 147,197 –534 18,449 705 165,646 171 76.18 0.12 76.50 0.32
1995 148,406 1,209 17,766 –683 166,172 526 76.38 0.21 76.82 0.44
1996 149,147 741 18,250 484 167,397 1,225 76.90 0.51 77.15 0.25
1997 150,070 923 18,142 –108 168,212 815 77.08 0.19 77.51 0.43
1998 152,494 2,424 17,258 –884 169,752 1,540 77.69 0.60 77.87 0.18
1999 155,272 2,778 16,157 –1,101 171,429 1,677 78.38 0.69 78.25 –0.13
2000 158,530 3,258 14,600 –1,557 173,130 1,701 79.17 0.79 78.64 –0.53
Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç
2005 169,602 2,214b 9,740 –972b 179,342 1,242b 81.84 0.53b
Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç
2010 175,619 1,203b 8,050 –338b 183,669 865b 83.45 0.32b
Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç
2015 180,051 886b 7,650 –80b 187,701 806b 85.12 0.33b
Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç
2020 184,595 909b 7,500 –30b 192,095 879b 87.65 0.51b
aHodrick-Prescott-Filter (100). – bYearly average of preceding five-year-period.
Source: EUROSTAT-Jahrbuch, Europa im Blick der Statistik, Ausgaben 2.1995/96, 3.1996/97, 4.1998/99, 5.2000. – EUROSTAT, Bevölkerungsstatistik 1960/99. –
EUROSTAT, Europäische Sozialstatistik - Bevölkerung, Ausgabe 2000. – EUROSTAT, Erhebung über Arbeitskräfte - Ergebnisse 1995–1999. – EUROSTAT,
Statistik kurzgefaßt, Bevölkerung und soziale Bedingungen, Thema 3 - 16/2000: Erste Bevölkerungsschätzungen für 2000. – OECD, Quarterly Labour Force
Statistics. – Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Ausland, various issues. – Own estimates, interpolations and forecasts.





Result. estimate for hidden unemployment
rate (mainly female discouraged
workers):b
Est. total (open and hidden)
unemployment:
Unemployment as %
of actual labour force
Est. total
unemployment as %































1985 76.72 164,235 7,411 31.81 23,295 10.13 14.18
1986 77.13 0.41 165,513 1,279 9,008 1,598 35.80 25,163 1,869 10.32 15.20
1987 77.54 0.41 166,824 1,311 7,892 –1,116 33.34 23,668 –1,495 9.93 14.19
1988 77.95 0.41 168,266 1,442 6,857 –1,035 31.56 21,727 –1,941 9.21 12.91
1989 78.34 0.39 169,591 1,325 7,381 524 35.33 20,892 –835 8.33 12.32
1990 78.71 0.37 170,858 1,268 6,143 –1,237 32.60 18,843 –2,048 7.71 11.03
1991 79.05 0.34 171,860 1,002 6,207 64 31.63 19,625 782 8.10 11.42
1992 79.38 0.33 172,714 853 7,212 1,004 31.99 22,544 2,918 9.26 13.05
1993 79.69 0.31 173,386 673 7,911 700 30.84 25,655 3,112 10.72 14.80
1994 80.00 0.31 173,963 577 8,317 406 31.07 26,766 1,111 11.14 15.39
1995 80.32 0.32 174,734 770 8,562 244 32.52 26,328 –439 10.69 15.07
1996 80.65 0.33 175,566 832 8,169 –393 30.92 26,419 91 10.90 15.05
1997 81.01 0.36 176,782 1,215 8,570 400 32.08 26,712 292 10.79 15.11
1998 81.37 0.36 177,804 1,022 8,052 –518 31.81 25,310 –1,402 10.17 14.23
1999 81.75 0.38 178,802 998 7,373 –679 31.33 23,530 –1,780 9.42 13.16
2000 82.14 0.39 179,630 828 6,500 –873 30.81 21,100 –2,430 8.43 11.75
Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç
2005 83.57 0.29c 183,131 700c 3,789 –542c 28.01 13,529 –1,514c 5.43 7.39
Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç
2010 84.90 0.27c 186,858 745c 3,189 –120c 28.37 11,239 –458c 4.38 6.01
Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç
2015 86.37 0.30c 190,466 722c 2,765 –85c 26.55 10,415 –165c 4.08 5.47
Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç
2020 88.79 0.48c 194,595 826c 2,500 –53c 25.00 10,000 –83c 3.90 5.14
a(Estimated Maximum Participation Rate*0.01)*(Smoothed Series of Persons in Working Age (excluding scholars and students)). – b(Estimated Maximum Labour Force – Actual Labour
Force). – cYearly average of preceding five-year-period.
Source: EUROSTAT-Jahrbuch, Europa im Blick der Statistik, Ausgaben 2.1995/96, 3.1996/97, 4.1998/99, 5.2000. – EUROSTAT, Bevölkerungsstatistik 1960/99. –
EUROSTAT, Europäische Sozialstatistik - Bevölkerung, Ausgabe 2000. – EUROSTAT, Erhebung über Arbeitskräfte - Ergebnisse 1995–1999. – EUROSTAT,
Statistik kurzgefaßt, Bevölkerung und soziale Bedingungen, Thema 3 - 16/2000: Erste Bevölkerungsschätzungen für 2000. – OECD, Quarterly Labour Force
Statistics. – Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Ausland, various issues. – Own estimates, interpolations and forecasts.
